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"The people have dreamed for 23 years about the UN coming
to East Timor. To see them, at last, gives them a sense of se-
curity and hope that their struggle will have an end."'
1. East Timor: Nervous Voters, ECONOMIST, June 19, 1999, at 34 (statement
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[NTRODUCTION
At one time, a United Nations (UN) presence2 in an area of con-
flict signified a restoration of peace and security.' UN-sponsored
agreements to monitor elections have proven successful in a number
of conflicts.' However, just as there are successes in UN election
monitoring, there are also "half-successes5 and even failures.' As
of a priest in East Timor).
2. United Nations "presence" has a number of meanings. Former Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defines the categories of
UN involvement as follows:
Preventative diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit
the spread of the latter when they occur. Peacemaking is action to bring hos-
tile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those
foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peace-
keeping... is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the preven-
tion of conflict and the making of peace. Post cotllict peace-building [is] ac-
tion to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and so-
lidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking. and Peacekeeping,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., paras. 20-21 U.N. Doc. AJ47/277 (1992) [hereinafter .-n
Agenda for Peace]; see also STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING:
BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995) (discuss-
ing a comprehensive study of UN efforts to restore peace).
3. The restoration of peace and security to an area of conflict is a fundamental
tenet of the UN. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I (calling for "the suppression of
acts of aggression" in order to "maintain international peace and security"); see
also Milestones in the United Nations History, available at
<gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/un50/MILESTON.DOC> [hereinafter Milestones]
(providing examples of UN involvement in the resolution of a number of conflicts
and listing awards the UN has received for its efforts at restoring peace and secu-
rity).
4. See GEOFFREY C. GUNN, EAST TIMOR AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A CASE
FOR INTERVENTION 88-102 (1997) (providing examples of successful elements
found in UN election monitoring and peacekeeping efforts in Namibia. Cambodia,
Western Sahara, El Salvador, Eritrea, and Mozambique; each providing lessons for
possible UN involvement in East Timor); YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL
MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-
DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 219 (1994) (pointing specifi-
cally to the Cambodian operation as a UN success, where peaceful solutions over-
rode the possibility of war).
5. See BEIGBEDER, ibid (defining "half-success" in the context of UN election
monitoring as one where the UN certifies an election "free and fair," but the disap-
pointed parties respond violently, renewing political instability or perhaps civil
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the need for impartial election monitoring grows, the UN must learn
from its mistakes in order to fulfill its primary goal of fostering
peace and security in the international community.!
In 1999, the United Nations had the opportunity to bring peace
and security to East Timor, a territory with a history of conflict.9 On
May 5, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal signed the
Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East
Timor ("General Agreement"), formally requesting UN electoral as-
sistance for East Timor.' ° That same day, the UN responded by
signing the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Gov-
ernments of Indonesia and Portugal Regarding the Modalities for the
Popular Consultation Through a Direct Ballot ("Modalities Agree-
war). Beigbeder suggests the UN mission in Angola is such an example.
6. See id. at 176 (labeling the 1991 UN-sponsored Haitian election a failure,
because the democratically-elected President Aristide was overthrown months later
by a coup d'etat). But see id. at 179 (noting that the international response to the
Haitian coup led to President Aristide's restoration, which could be viewed as a
democratic success).
7. See generally Susan Marks, The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization:
Guarding the Gates with Two Faces: International Law and Political Reconstruc-
lion, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 457, 488-90 (1999) (observing the early 1990's
increase in UN election monitoring invitations, which evolved from decolonization
efforts following World War II); Margaret Satterthwaite, Comment, Human Rights
Monitoring, Elections Monitoring, and Electoral Assistance as Preventive Meas-
ures, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol 709, 710-11 (1998) (pointing to the expansion of
UN election monitoring over the past ten years as an example of conflict preven-
tion); Thomas M. Frank, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am.
J. Int'l L. 46, 55 (1992) (observing the expansion of UN election monitoring from
traditional decolonization efforts to internal matters); Melida N. Hodgson, When to
Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework for U.N. Election Monitoring, 25 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 137, 143-45 (1992) (citing the goal of maintaining international
peace and security as the UN's justification for monitoring elections within inde-
pendent states).
8. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1 (noting that the first purpose of the UN is
"maintain[ing] international peace and security").
9. See discussion infra Part I (summarizing East Timor's conflict-riddled
history).
10. Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor,
U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., Annex I, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1999/513 (1999) [hereinafter
General Agreement] (requesting UN monitoring of a popular consultation in East
Timor, in which (1) Indonesia would present a proposal for autonomy; and (2) the
East Timorese would vote either to accept the proposal or pursue independence).
[16:199
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ment")" and the Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Governments of Indonesia and Portugal Regarding Security Ar-
rangements ("Security Agreement"), 2 in which the UN promised to
organize and conduct a popular consultation in the territory." The
subsequent arrival of the United Nations Mission to East Timor
("UNAMET")14 might have given the East Timorese people a "sense
of security,"" but UNAMET's mandate did not allow the mission to
provide actual security.'6 Even after an overwhelming vote" to end
11. Agreement Betiveen the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia
and Portugal Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation Through a
Direct Ballot, U.N. SCOR 53d Sess., Annex 11, at 24 U.N. Doc. S/ 1999/513 (1999)
[hereinafter Modalities Agreement]
12. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia
and Portugal Regarding Security Arrangements. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., Annex IIl
at 29, U.N. Doc. S/1999/513 (1999) [hereinafter Securit" Agreenent]
13. See Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Remarks at L'. Headquarters on the
Announcement of the May 5th Agreements (May 6. 1999) available at
<http://wwwv.un.org/News!Press/docs/1999> [hereinafter MaY 5 Agreements Press
Conference] (announcing the signing of the May 5 Agreements).
14. See S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4013th mtg., para. 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1246 (1999) (establishing UNAMET to: (1) certify the outcome of the
popular consultation; and (2) aid the Secretary-General in carrying out his respon-
sibilities under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement). In order to assist the Sec-
retary-General under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement, UNAMET was
charged with providing an "objective assessment" of the security situation. See Se-
curity Agreement, supra note 12, para. 3 (requiring the Secretary-General to ensure
adequate security existed before proceeding with the implementation of the popu-
lar consultation).
15. See East Timor. Nervous Voters, supra note 1, at 34 (reporting the hopes of
young and old East Timorese that a UN presence would lead to the peaceful lib-
eration of their homeland).
16. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, para. 9 (stressing Indonesia's responsi-
bility to provide security during the consultation process). The UN Security Coun-
cil declined to add a security component to UNAMET's mandate because Portugal
and the UN entrusted Indonesia with primary responsibility for security. See Gen-
eral Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3 (assigning Indonesia the responsibility to
guarantee a fair and peaceful vote); Modalities Agreement. supra note 11, at § G
(assigning Indonesia the responsibility for ensuring the safety of UN personnel
sent to monitor the vote); Security Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 4 (assigning
security responsibility to Indonesian police during the consultation process).
17. See Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Remarks to the Security Council about
the People of East Timor Reject Proposed Special .Anatom. Erpress Wish to Be-
gin the Transition to Independence (Sept. 3. 1999) available at
<http://vww.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999> [hereinafter East Timorese Reject
2000]
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Indonesia's twenty-three year occupation and begin the process of
self-determination,' 8 the East Timorese struggle did not end.' 9 Fol-
lowing the vote, militias supporting integration with Indonesia
launched a massive campaign of violence, including widespread
looting, arson, displacement, torture, and murder.0 Instead of pro-
viding security to the East Timorese, a commitment made under the
May 5 Agreements, 2' the Indonesian security forces not only allowed
gross violations of human rights to take place,2 but often engaged in
acts of violence against the East Timorese.23
Autonomy] (announcing the result of the August 30, 1999 popular consultation in
East Timor). The results of the consultation were 25.1% in favor and 78.5%
against Indonesia's autonomy proposal. Id.
18. While failing to explicitly define "self-determination" in the UN Charter,
the UN considers this right as one of the organization's founding principles. See
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (believing the respect for equal rights and self-
determination are the basis for developing friendly relations among nations). The
right to self-determination, once restricted to the decolonization process, has ex-
panded to a democratic right within independent states. See discussion infra Part
II.A (considering different definitions of self-determination as a legal right).
19. See Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human
Rights Situation in East Timor, U.N. ESCOR, 4th Special Sess., paras. 14-46, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/S-4/CRP. I (1999) [hereinafter Human Rights Report] (reporting on
the "breakdown of law and order," "wanton killings," "forcible expulsions," "[in-
humane] treatment of women," "enforced and involuntary disappearances," "dis-
place[ment] [of] persons," "destruction of property," and "[interference with] the
media" following the August 30 vote).
20. See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the
Secretary General, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 96, paras. 120-142, U.N. Doc. S/2000/59 (2000) [hereinafter Com-
mission Report] (providing conclusions from the International Commission of In-
quiry on the human rights situation following the vote and finding that gross hu-
manitarian violations took place); Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, Report
by the Secretaiy General, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Agenda Item 166 (c) at 28-40,
U.N. Doc. A/54/660 (1999) [hereinafter Human Rights Situation] (providing de-
tailed accounts of the militias' violent acts following the August 30 vote, based on
reports to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights).
21. See General Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3 (binding Indonesia to guar-
antee a peaceful vote); Security Agreement, supra note 12, art. 4 (creating a legal
duty for Indonesia to provide security through the entire consultation process).
22. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19, para. 16 (recording UN eyewit-
ness reports that Indonesian forces willfully failed to restore the peace).
23. See id. (including additional UN eyewitness reports that the Indonesian se-




The East Timor model provides considerable insight on what the
UN should avoid in future election monitoring missions. This Com-
ment submits that the UN failed to negotiate the most basic require-
ments for a peaceful vote in East Timor. While the organization of
the UN mission may be commended,4 inherent flaws in the May 5
Agreements enabled a climate rife with violence.*'
Part I traces East Timor's history, touching on the centuries of for-
eign occupation as well as the specific events that led up to the ne-
gotiation and signing of the May 5 Agreements. Part II provides
definitions essential to understanding why the East Timorese had a
legal right to pursue independence (self-determination) and how the
UN attempted to ensure that right (electoral assistance) through a
binding legal agreement (consent). Part III explores the legal and
political constraints on enforcing self-determination through elec-
toral assistance. This section also explains why East Timor saw no
international enforcement of its right to self-determination until the
UN, Portugal, and Indonesia signed the May 5 Agreements. Part IV
analyzes the provisions and purposes of the May 5 Agreements, and
points out major flaws in their development and execution. Part V
gives recommendations for ensuring success in future UN election
monitoring efforts, should the UN choose to be so involved. This
Comment concludes with a plea to the UN to learn from its mistakes
in East Timor and take the necessary steps to secure peace when
providing electoral assistance to territories in conflict.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The people of East Timor have not known independence for
nearly three centuries.6 While the UN has long recognized the East
24. UNAMET managed to register over four-hundred and fifty thousand voters
in a little under two months. See East Tinorese Reject .lutonoyv, supra note 17.
25. See discussion hifra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (describing the
breakdown of law and order in East Timor following the vote).
26. See 10 CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS SERIES: EAST TIMOR
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: BASIC DOCUIMENTS xix (Heike Krieger ed.
1997) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS] (discussing Portugal's colonization
of the territory, which began in 1701, and Indonesia's illegal occupation of East
Timor, which began with an invasion of the temrtory in 1975); see also, John G.
Taylor, The Emergence of a Nationalist Afovenent in East Tinor, in EAST TIMOR
AT THE CROSSROADS: THE FORGING OF A NATIoN 23-25. 36-3) (Peter Care), & G.
2000]
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Timorese right to pursue independence, political factors and legal
questions have hindered UN efforts to assist the East Timorese in
achieving this goal. In order to understand the difficulties the UN
faced when negotiating the May 5 Agreements, it is important to
consider East Timor's history of foreign occupation and the interna-
tional response.
A. FOREIGN OCCUPATION: PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION AND
INDONESIAN INVASION
Portugal controlled the region" that is now East Timor for the
greater part of the 18th, 19th, and 20th Centuries. 2' Even when the
UN General Assembly called for an end to colonization in 1960,*9
Portugal maintained colonial control of the territory.3" At that time,
the General Assembly condemned Portugal's behavior and recog-
Carter Bentley eds. 1995) [hereinafter Nationalist Movement] (chronicling Portu-
guese interaction and subsequent invasion of East Timor, and discussing the politi-
cal implications of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor more than two centuries
later).
27. The "region" referred to in the text covers 146,000 square kilometers on
the eastern half of Timor island. See CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at
xix.
28. See id. (stating that Portugal claimed East Timor as its own and treated the
region as "part of its metropolitan territory" up until 1974).
29. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947 plen. Mtg., Supp. No.
16, at 67, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) [hereinafter Decolonization Declara-
tion] (requiring the transfer of colonial powers back to indigenous peoples ac-
cording to the peoples' will). General Assembly Resolution 1514 deemed coloni-
zation a "denial of fundamental human rights" and "contrary" to the UN Charter.
Id. at 1.
30. See Territories Under Portuguese Administration, G.A. Res. 1699 1807,
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Agenda item 54, 1194th plen. Mtg. at I, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1807 (1962) (deploring Portugal's lack of regard for the will of the territo-
ries under its administration to exercise self-determination and pursue independ-
ence). Portugal's colonies in 1962 included: the Cape Verde Archipelago, Guinea
(called Portuguese Guinea), Sao Tome and Principe, Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda,
Angola, Mozambique, Goa (called the state of India), Macau, and Timor (East
Timor). See Transmission of Information Under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A.
Res. 1542, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., paras. 1-2 U.N. Doc. A/RES/1542 (1960)
(listing the colonies under Portuguese administration and requiring Portugal to




nized East Timor as a "non-self-governing" territory' with the right
to self-determination 2 under Chapter XI of the UN Charter." Portu-
gal held its colonial grasp on East Timor until July 1974, when the
Portuguese government amended the national constitution to recog-
nize the right of self-determination in all Portuguese colonies. "
With Portugal loosening its grip over East Timor, three core po-
litical groups emerged: the Democratic Union of East Timor
("UDT") 5 the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
("FRETILIN"), "' and the Timorese Democratic People's Union
("APODETI")." UDT and FRETILIN supported full East Timorese
independence. UDT favored a transitional period, keeping Portugal
involved with East Timorese governance for a limited period, while
FRETILIN called for immediate expulsion of the former colonizer."
31. The UN defines "non-self-governing" ternitories as those "whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." U.N. CHARTER, art. 73
32. See discussion infl-a Part II.A (providing the legal definition and e~olution
of the right to self-determination).
33. G.A. Res. 1542, supra note 30, para. 1.
34. See PORT. CONST. (Port. Council of State, Constitutional La%% 7-74, Jul,
1974) art. 2, reprinted in CAMBRIDGE DOCUENTS. suipra note 26, at 34 (%ai% ing
provisions in Portugal's 1933 constitution, which denied the right to self-
determination and independence to Portugal's overseas teritones).
35. See Nationalist Mfovement. supra note 26. at 33 (writing that independence
supporters created UDT on May 1I, 1974).
36. See id. (stating that FRETILIN grew out of the Association of East
Timorese Democrats (ASDT) in 1974).
37. See id. at 34 (remarking that APODETI, a fringe group supporting integra-
tion with Indonesia, grew over time).
38. See id. at 33 (defining the UDT and FRETILIN as pro-independence fac-
tions). A UN report identified the UDT as a party that favored maintaining a rela-
tionship with Portugal until East Timor could become self-sufficient. See Special
Committee on the Situation with Regard to lnplenentation o- the Dechration on
the Granting of Irdependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Working Paper
on Timor Prepared by the Secretariat. U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Annex. para. 11,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.1015,Annexes (1975) reprinted in C\\IBRIDUE
DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 19 [hereinafter Working Paper on Tunor] (noting
that most of the leaders of UDT wvere Portuguese government officials). The same
report identified FRETILIN as the largest political party in East Timor at that time.
See id. at 19, para. 12 (noting in addition that FRETILIN was composed largely of
intellectuals).
39. See Working Paper on Tinor. supra note 38. paras. 11-12 (stating that
2000]
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The third group, APODETI, advocated integration with Indonesia."'
Portugal agreed to remain in the region until 1978 and oversee a vote
between the three factions, with the intention of administering a
peaceful transition to the newly-elected government.4 ' The UN sup-
ported the Portuguese plan) 2
Unfortunately, the UN-praised Portuguese plan for East Timor
never took place. The outbreak of civil war in 1975 interfered with
the Portuguese-sponsored vote. 3 On November 28 of that year,
FRETILIN declared unilateral independence over East Timor."
APODETI, UDT and other political groups urged Indonesia to inter-
vene in the conflict.45 Indonesia invaded East Timor on December 7,
1975,6 justifying this action based on its shared ethnic history with
the territory. On December 17 of that year, Indonesia set up a pro-
UDT favored Portuguese assistance with transitional independence, while
FRETILIN favored complete independence from Portugal and a close relationship
with Indonesia).
40. See Nationalist Movement, supra note 26, at 33 (defining APODETI as the
pro-integration faction). The Working Paper on Timor identified APODETI as the
smallest of the three main factions. See Working Paper on Timor, supra note 38,
para. 13 (noting that APODETI favored integration with Indonesia based on "cul-
tural links").
41. See Nationalist Movement, supra note 26, at 33 (explaining Portugal's at-
tempt to assist or control East Timor's shift towards self-determination).
42. See G.A. Res. 3113, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3113 (1973) (welcoming Portugal's new policy regarding East Timor).
43. See Nationalist Movement, supra note 26, at 34-37 (chronicling the chaotic
events in East Timor between 1974-76, when UDT, FRETILIN, and APODETI
engaged in civil war).
44. See id. at 35, 36 (claiming that FRETILIN gained popular support through
an independent vote).
45. See Joint Proclamation by APODETI, UDT KOTA and the Partido Trabil-
hista, encl., Letter dated 4 December 1975from the Permanent Representative of
Indonesia addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 30th Sess.,
Agenda Item 23, 88, at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/808 (1975), reprinted in CAMBRIDGE
DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 44 [hereinafter Integration Proclamation] (sup-
porting full integration with Indonesia and urging the Indonesian government to
protect the lives of pro-integrationist East Timorese).
46. See John G. Taylor, East Timor: Contemporary lHistory: A Chronologyr of
the Main Events, in EAST TIMOR AT THE CROSSROADS: THE FORGING OF A
NATION, supra note 26, at 238 (Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, eds.
1995)_[hereinafter Chronology].
47. See Nationalist Movement, supra note 26, at 34 (implying skepticism at In-
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visional government in East Timor" and continued to occupy the re-
gion for nearly twenty-five years." Estimates of the East Timorese
death toll from the first four years of Indonesia's invasion and an-
nexation are between ten percent and thirty percent of the East
Timorese population5'
B. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The UN condemned the Indonesian invasion of 1975 and rejected
Indonesia's subsequent claims that the people of East Timor freely
chose integration.5' UN Security Council Resolutions 384 and 389,
passed in December 1975 and April 1996. respectively, reaffirmed
the UN's support of East Timor's right to self-determination and
called upon the government of Indonesia to "withdraw without fur-
ther delay all its forces from the Territory."- From 1975 to 1982, the
donesia's justification for the invasion, based on a cultural connection and shared
history with East Timor).
48. See Declaration on the Establishment of a Provisional Government uf the
Territory of East Timnor, encl. Letter dated 22 December 1975 ron the Permanent
Representative of Indonesia addressed to the Secretary-General, A 31 42 (1974),
reprinted in CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 46 (claiming the Indone-
sian-controlled provisional government reflected the determination of the East
Timorese).
49. See Nationalist Movement, supra note 26, at 34-37 (discussing lndonesia's
occupation of East Timor generally). Indonesian control over East Timor ended in
October of 1999, when the Indonesian government formally recognized the will of
East Timorese to pursue independence and transferred administrative power to the
UN. See S.C. Res. 1272 U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.. U.N. Doc. S RES 1272 (1999)
(welcoming Indonesia's decision to honor the August 30 vote for East Timorese
independence, and setting up the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET) to administer the territory until the people achieve full in-
dependence).
50. See James Dunn, The Timnor Affair in International Perspective, in EA'NST
TIMOR AT THE CROSSROADS: THE FORGING OF A NATION. supra note 26, at 67
[hereinafter Tinor Affair] (citing a report of aid workers, who were allowed entry
into East Timor four years after the invasion).
51. See S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., para. 2. U.N. Doc. SRES 389
(1976), and S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR. 30th Sess., paras. 1-2 U.N. Doc.
S/RES/389 (1976) (calling on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor
and recognize the East Timorese right to self-determination).
52. See id. (calling on all member states to respect East Timor's right to self-
determination and help further the decolonization of the territory).
2000] 209
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General Assembly passed a series of resolutions,5 including Resolu-
tion 37/30, which ordered the Special Committee on the Situation
with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to keep the
situation in East Timor under active consideration as a problem of
decolonization. 5' In addition, Resolution 37/30 called on the U.N.
Secretary General to consult with Indonesia and Portugal regarding
the East Timor crisis. 5 Beginning in 1982, Indonesia and Portugal
participated in annual meetings through the Secretary General's of-
fice to resolve the question of East Timor.
6
53. The following UN General Assembly Resolutions condemned Indonesia's
occupation of East Timor and reaffirmed the territory's right to self-determination:
G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR 37th Sess. U.N. Doc., para. 1, A/RES/37/30 (1992)
(requesting the Secretary-General to work with interested parties and assist East
Timor in exercising its right to self-determination through peaceful means); G.A.
Res. 36/50, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., paras. 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/50 (1981)
(expressing concern about famine in East Timor and encouraging Portugal as well
as the international community to join together in support of East Timor's right to
self-determination); G.A. Res. 35/27, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/35/27 (1980) (reaffirming East Timor's right to self-determination and
noting the twenty year anniversary of the original declaration granting East
Timorese that right); G.A. Res. 34/30, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess. paras. 1-2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/34/30 (1979) (reaffirming East Timor's right to self-determination
and declaring that "the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine
their own future, under the auspices of the United Nations"); G.A. Res. 33/39,
U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/39 (1978) (recognizing the
legitimacy of East Timor's struggle for independence); G.A. Res. 32/34, U.N.
GAOR, 32d Sess., paras. 3, 7 U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/34 (1977) (reaffirming East
Timor's right to self-determination and requesting entry for the Red Cross); G.A.
Res. 31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., paras. 5, 6 U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/53 (1976)
(rejecting Indonesia's claim of voluntary East Timorese integration and calling on
Indonesia to withdraw from the territory); G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess., paras. 5, 6 U.N. Doc. A/RES/3485 (1975) (calling the Indonesian invasion a
"violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor").
54. See G.A. Res. 37/30, supra note 53, para. 2 (requesting the Committee on
Decolonization to assist the Secretary-General to facilitate the implementation of
the relevant resolution).
55. See S.C. Res. 389, supra note 51, para. 3 (asking the Secretary-General to
consult with Indonesia and Portugal in the hopes of reaching a settlement to the
question of East Timor).
56. See S.C. Res. 1236, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1236 (1999)
(mentioning that the governments of Indonesia and Portugal have worked for a
solution to the question of East Timor's right to self-determination through the
good offices of the Secretary-General since 1983).
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Between 1982 and 1999, the UN organs did not pass any resolu-
tions to address Indonesia's violent occupation of East Timor." On
November 12, 1991, the violence in the region escalated when Indo-
nesian troops opened fire on unarmed pro-independence marchers."
The UN viewed the incident as a human rights tragedy, but passed
no resolutions.9
The UN remained passive in enforcing East Timor's right to self-
determination. This was in part because its member states had dif-
fering views as to whether or not the U.N. should recognize Indone-
sia's claim to the territory should be recognized." ' For example,
Australia recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor de
jure6' and entered into a treaty with Indonesia affecting East
57. S.C. Res. 1236 was the first Security Council resolution passed regarding
East Timor's status since 1982.
58. See Pat Walsh, Towards a Just Peace. in E.A'T TIMOR -X1 TIL-
CROSSROADS: THE FORGING OF A NATION. sujpra note 26. at 148, 149 (calling the
Dili Massacre a possible turning point in East Timor's history'.
59. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 85 (interpreting the UN response to the Dili
Massacre was a "shift" in UN priorities for East Timor "'from self-determination to
humanitarian issues").
60. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DE TLRMI\ATIO\ 0! PEt.It s 223-
30 (1995) (evaluating the differing views in the international community wvith re-
gards to East Timor's status and considering the case of East Timor a "test" of in-
ternational law); see also discussion infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the different positions held by member states): discussion inrka Part I11.B
(arguing that the UN's inaction in regards to the question of East Timor was politi-
cally motivated).
61. See Comm. Rec. 25-26, as sumniarized in Australian Foreign Atfairs Rec-
ord 49 (1978), reprinted in CAMBRIDGE DOCUIENTS, supra note 26. at 333
(statement of Mr. A. S. Peacock, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia) (recog-
nizing Australia's willingness to accept East Timor as Indonesian territory). De
jure recognition of a state is recognition with implied appro% al of the government.
See STATE PRACTICE REGARDING STATE SUCCESSION AND ISSUES OF RECOGNITION
38 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter STATE PRATICE] (defining the
forms of recognition States lend to new governments, ranging from recognition of
a government's control over territory to actual approval (de jure) of that new gov-
ernment). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS L.-% OF THE
UNITED STATES § 201 (1999) (noting that the term 'de jure," as applied to state
recognition, has been used with "varying and uncertain meaning"). The drafters of
the Restatement chose not to include this term when discussing the international
practice of state recognition. Id.
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Timorese territorial waters. 2 In the ensuing suit by Portugal against
Australia, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") reaffirmed East
Timor's right to self-determination.6 ' However, the ICJ did not find
that all necessary parties were before the Court and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction." Without a ruling invalidating the
agreement, the treaty with Australia remained valid."
Australia was not the only state that recognized the de jure sover-
eignty of Indonesia over East Timor. A handful of other UN member
states accepted Indonesia's integration claims as well. 6 Australia and
other U.N. member states have entered into bilateral treaties with In-
donesia,67 demonstrating at least de facto recognition of Indonesian
sovereignty.68 For example, between 1976 and 1992 twenty-eight
states, including France, Great Britain, and the United States, entered
62. See Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of
Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and
Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, Indon.-Austl., art. 2.1, art. 2.2, 29 I.L.M. 475-
537 (1990) (recognizing East Timor as an Indonesian province when setting up a
"zone of cooperation" for the purposes of drilling oil).
63. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austrl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 37
(June 30) ("[T]he Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory
and its people has the right to self-determination.").
64. See id. paras. 35-38 (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction over
Indonesia, and thus could not have jurisdiction over the validity of the treaty).
65. See Lian A. Mito, The Timor Gap TreatY as a Model for Joint Development
in the Spratly Islands, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 758 (1998) (noting that the
terms of the Timor Gap Treaty have been carried out, including the conclusion of
production sharing contracts, oil drilling, and seismic surveys).
66. See CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at xxiv-xxv (listing Bangla-
desh, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, Suriname, and Thailand as states which recognize Indonesia's
de jure sovereignty over East Timor).
67. See Counter-Memorial of the Government of Australia (Port. v. Austrl.)
1995 I.C.J. 90, app. C (June 1, 1992), reprinted in CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra
note 26, at 291 (listing double taxation agreements with territorial clauses between
Indonesia and various states).
68. De facto recognition of a state does not require approval of the govern-
ment's activities, merely an acceptance of that government's control over the ter-
ritory in question. See STATE PRACTICE, supra note 61, at 38 (explaining that de
facto recognition can include disapproval over the way a government has taken
over a state, but recognizes it nonetheless).
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into bilateral double taxation treaties with Indonesia." Many of these
treaties include clauses, which read: "the term 'Indonesia' comprises
the territory of the Republic of Indonesia as defined in its laws.""
Indonesian law deemed East Timor to be an Indonesian territory."
While numerous member states recognized de jure or de facto In-
donesian sovereignty over East Timor, the UN and other member
states recognized East Timor as a non-self-governing territory, with
Portugal as the administering power.", Notably, many of the states
that recognized de facto Indonesian sovereignty did not deny East
Timor's right to self-determination under the UN Charter." The de-
bate in the international community surrounded the question of
whether Portugal or Indonesia was truly responsible for East Timor's
future.7
4
C. NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION
The international community never a reached consensus on the
question of East Timor." Instead, Portugal and Indonesia came to a
compromise for determining East Timor's future." In 1998, a change
69. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austrl.), 1995 I.C.J., Counter-
Memorial of the Government of Australia, 1 June 1992 , Appendix C reprinted in
CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 291 (providing a sampling of double-
taxation agreements with territorial clauses.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at xxv (remarking that mem-
ber states of the European Union do not accept Indonesia's de jure or de facto sov-
ereignty over East Timor).
73. See id. (writing that states including Canada, Japan. Mauritania, New Zea-
land, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, and the United States recognized the East
Timorese right to self-determination).
74. See id. (presenting the different views in the international community sur-
rounding East Timor's status).
75. See generally CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS. supra note 26, at xxiii-xxv (relat-
ing conflicting views in the international community as to whether the Indonesian
invasion of East Timor was legal, and disagreement among states regarding
whether East Timor was legally integrated into Indonesia): see also discussion in-
fra Part III.B (providing the political debate over East Timor's status).
76. See May 5 Agreements Press Conlerence. supra note 13 (statement of Kofi
Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations) (commending the efforts of Portugal
and Indonesia in the negotiations that led to the sipning of the May 5 Agreements).
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in Indonesian leadership 7 fostered an expansion of the Portuguese-
Indonesian talks through the Secretary General's good offices."8 One
year later, Indonesia presented a special autonomy for the people of
East Timor , in which the Indonesian Central Government and mili-
tary forces would maintain control over East Timor, but the Special
Autonomous Region of East Timor ("SARET") would be able to
form its own government with special legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial powers. Under Indonesia's autonomy proposal, some of
SARET's privileges would include: conducting its own elections,"''
creating and enforcing its own laws,' and entering into international
agreements, 2 so long as it acts in compliance with Indonesian law."
On May 5, 1999, the UN, Portugal, and Indonesia concluded talks
on Indonesia's autonomy proposal." Portugal agreed to accept the
proposal so long as the people of East Timor could be consulted, by
secret ballot, as to whether they wished to accept Indonesian auton-
77. See David Lamb & Rone Tempest, Suharto Resigns in Indonesia, Hands
Power to Vice President; Asia: After Massive Protests, Deadly Riots and Interna-
tional Pressure, Leader of 32 Years Steps Aside, Army Pledges Loyalty to fhabibie,
but it is unclear Whether He will Complete President ' Term, L.A. TIMES, May 21,
1998, at A l (reporting on the transfer of power from Indonesian President Suharto
to B.J. Habibe, based on pressure from Suharto's own party and military support
for Habibe). The full text of Suharto's resignation speech can be found in Till'
JAKARTA POST, May 22, 1998, at News.
78. The Security Council referred to the talks in S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, at
preamble.
79. General Agreement, supra note 10, appendix. The constitutional frame-
work for a special autonomy was originally drafted by the UN and later amended
by Indonesia. See id. preamble, para. 4
80. See id. art. 46(g) (providing for the right of governmental participation
through free elections as a tenet of human rights norms).
81. See id. arts. 22-45 (listing the powers of the SARET, including legislative,
executive, and judicial powers and institutions).
82. See id. art. 55 (allowing the SARET to enter into agreements and partici-
pate other activities with foreign nations, to benefit from international develop-
ment assistance, and to offer foreign governments the opportunity to open repre-
sentative offices in East Timor).
83. See id. arts. 1-11 (cataloging the Indonesian powers over the SARET in the
areas of foreign relations, defense, economic and fiscal policies).
84. See May 5 Agreements Press Conference, supra note 13 (welcoming the
conclusion of talks on the question of East Timor and praising the completion of
the signing of three agreements between the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal).
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omy or pursue independence.)5 Portugal and Indonesia decided that
an independent body, namely the UN, should supervise the consulta-
tion. 6 In the General Agreement, Portugal and Indonesia formally
requested UN assistance in presenting the autonomy plan to the East
Timorese people. 7 The Secretary General immediately signed the
Modalities and Security Agreements, expressing the UN's commit-
ment to organize and conduct the consultation.
On June 11, 1999, the United Nations Security Council estab-
lished UNAMET to monitor the popular consultation in East Timor."
Despite interference from pro-Indonesian militias,"' UNAMET man-
aged to register 451,792 voters" in two short months. Defying the
militia's campaign of intimidation, 438,968 voters visited the polls.4
85. See General Agreement, supra note 10. art. 1 (requesting the Secretary-
General to consult the East Timorese, through secret ballot, as to whether they
wish to accept or reject the proposed constitutional framew ork for special auton-
omy).
86. See id. preamble, para. 7 (maintaining separate positions on the status of
East Timor, but agreeing that the UN Secretary-General should consult the East
Timorese on the Autonomy Proposal).
87. See id. arts. 1-2 (asking the Secretary-General to present the special auton-
omy proposal to the people of East Timor through a popular consultation and to
establish a UN mission to help carry out the consultation).
88. See Modalities Agreement. supra note 11. preamble (agreeing to make
preparations for the popular consultation by appointing persons to facilitate the
consultation); Security Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3 (committing a minimum
level of security to ensure peaceful implementation).
89. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14. (establishing UNA\ILT to organize the
popular consultation through a secret ballot to determine whether the people of
East Timor accept or reject the proposed constitutional framework). The Security
Council established UNAMET "'in accordance with the General Agreement and to
enable the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility under paragraph 3 of
the Security Agreement." Id.
90. See Security Council, Through Presidential Statement. Erprese Grave
Concern at 29 June Attack on UNA MET Office in Maliana, East Timor. ,tvaLlable
at <http://-vvv.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999> [hereinafter .hfhana ..Ittack] (re-
porting that acts of violence committed by militias in East Timor were endangenng
the consultation process).
91. See East Timorese Reject Autonon', sqiwa note 17 tstatement of Kofi An-
nan, Secretary-General, United Nations) (praising UNAMET's successful regis-
tration of voters).
92. See id. (praising the high voter turnout, despite the violence).
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About seventy-nine percent of them chose to pursue independence.'
In response to the vote, the pro-Indonesian militias, aided by Gen-
eral Wiranto 4 and the Indonesian military forces (TNI),95 expanded
their campaign of intimidation to a campaign of vengeance. 6 Militia
members began an armed assault, torturing and killing unarmed citi-
zens and burning East Timorese property to the ground.97 While all
East Timorese were subject to the violence,"' the militias specifically
targeted independence supporters and members of the clergy for
execution.99 A report of the High Commissioner for Human rights
93. See id. (announcing that 25.1% of the voters were in favor and 78.5% voted
against Indonesia's autonomy proposal).
94. General Wiranto, former Indonesian military commander, faces possible
arrest for his connection to the widespread human rights abuses in East Timor. See.
e.g., Seth Mydans, East Timor, Stuck at 'Ground Zero,' Lacks Law, Order and
Much More, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at A 11 [hereinafter Ground Zero] (noting
that Wiranto, along with other senior Indonesian officials, faces possible indict-
ment); Richard Lloyd Parry, East Timor Issues First War-Crimes Warrants on Mi-
litia; Indonesia Atrocities as UN Ready to Publish Reports on Last Year s Massa-
cres, Prosecutors Pursue Notorious Militia Leader, INDEP., Jan. 31, 2000, at
Foreign News, 10 (reporting that in addition to East Timor's efforts to indict mili-
tia leaders, an Indonesian commission recommended that 200 people, including
Wiranto, should be prosecuted).
95. See Commission Report, supra note 20, paras. 135-141 (reporting on evi-
dence linking the TNI to the militias); see also id. paras. 120-142 reporting evi-
dence that the TNI's policy was to recruit, provide funding and weaponry, and
train the militia; meanwhile creating the impression that the violence stemmed
from infighting among the East Timorese); id. paras. 136-37 (referring to the
TNI's policy of militia engagement).
96. See infia notes 98-103 and accompanying text (describing the militia-led
rampage following the August 30 vote).
97. See Keith B. Richburg, East Timor Spirals Toward Anarchy, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Richburg, East Timor Spirals] (reporting that
thousands of East Timorese fled as pro-Indonesian militias ravaged the territory,
shooting indiscriminately and burning property to the ground).
98. See Human Rights Situation, supra note 19, para. 28 (reporting that in ad-
dition to selective attacks, the militias also engaged in indiscriminate acts of ter-
ror).
99. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19, para. 19, 25 (reporting that the
militias were clearly targeting independence supporters and members of the clergy,
entering the camps with lists of supporters' names, and sometimes carrying out on-
the-spot executions); see also Seth Mydans, The Fate of East Timor: The Ram-
page; Priests and Nuns Become Targets of Terror, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1999, at
A12 [hereinafter The Rampage] (reporting on the murders of nuns, priests, and the
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estimates that 200,000 to 250,000 East Timorese were driven from
their homes,"" including the entire population of East Timor's capitol
city, Dili.1 'O According to official UNAMET eyewitness testimony,
the Indonesian security forces supported the attacks by either failing
to quell the violence or taking part in the militias' campaign.'":
II. DEFINITIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND UN
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
The militias and Indonesian police engaged in the acts described
above as part of Indonesia's historic attempt to deprive the East
Timorese of their right to self-determination.'"' Although the nuances
surrounding the right to self-determination are beyond the scope of
this paper,'O' a brief definition of the right is included below, along
father of Jose Alexhandre Gusmao, the leader of the East Timorese independence
movement).
100. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19. para. 30. But see Human Rights
Situation, supra note 19, para. 20 (reporting that 400,000 East Timorese were dis-
placed); Ground Zero, supra note 95 (estimating that 120.000 to 200,000 of East
Timor's 880,000 people were driven from their homes by the militias).
101. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19, para. 30 (reporting that all the
people of Dili were either forcibly displaced or fled their homes into the hills sur-
rounding the capital).
102. See id. para. 16 (reporting that UN staff witnessed armed police allow vio-
lent acts to take place, or even engage in acts of violence against East Timorese).
According to UNAMET staff, militia passed through police checkpoints and past
TNI soldiers, and TNI soldiers helped the militia loot UNAMET vehicles. See id.
para. 15.
103. See Timor Affair, supra note 50, at 61 (writing that as early as 1974, Indo-
nesia began producing propaganda aimed at depriving the East Timorese right to
self-determination).
104. For more on this topic, see, e.g.. HURST HANNUI, ALTO\OMY.,
SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1996); CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, supra
note 60; Antonio Cassese, Political Self-Deternination-Old Concepts and New
Developments, in UN LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO ToPICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979); Michael J. Kelly, Political
Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-Deterinihation, and the Movement Toward
Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 209 (1999); Mechelle
Evans & Darilyn T. Olidge, What Can the Past Teach the Future? Lessons from
Internationally Supervised Self-Determination Elections 1920-1990, 24 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1711 (1992).
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with a longer explanation electoral assistance, the main method of
self-determination enforcement. An understanding of both defini-
tions and an appreciation of the legal and political factors surround-
ing East Timor's right to self-determination provide the context in
which the May 5 Agreements were signed.
A. SELF-DETERMINATION: A LEGAL RIGHT
As one of the founding principles of the UN Charter, "self-
determination"'' ° is well recognized as a legal right under interna-
tional law.' 6 Curiously, the Charter refrains from defining the right
explicitly, but subsequent documents consider self-determination the
right of peoples to "freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.." While
the international community accepts this definition, legal scholars
debate the right's scope.' At issue among scholars is whether the
right applies externally or internally.'09 External self-determination,
105. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2 (citing respect for the self determination
as the basis for strengthening relations among nations). Self-determination is men-
tioned again a second time in the Charter with respect to economic and social co-
operation. See id. art. 55 (emphasizing the need to create stable conditions to fostcr
equal rights and self-determination and promote human rights).
106. In addition to references in the UN Charter, self-determination is affirmed
as an international right in ICJ decisions and multilateral treaties. See e.g., Port. v.
Austrl., 1995 I.C.J. 90, supra note 69, para. 36; Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 13
(Oct. 16) (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note
30; Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendli Rela-
tions and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter qf the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
107. ICCPR, ibid; Decolonization Declaration, supra note 29, at para. 2.
108. See Brandi J. Pummell, The Timor Gap: Who Decides Who is in Control?,
26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 655, 666-67 (1998) (setting out the arguments
among scholars regarding the scope and character of self-determination and noting
that some scholars believe the right to self-determination should be limited to for-
mer colonies, while others believe it should extend to all people).
109. See id. (arguing that East Timor falls in the external category).
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normally applied to former colonies or illegally occupied regions, is
the right to choose integration with an existing state or pursue inde-
pendence." ° Internal self-determination is the right of peoples within
an existing state to choose their own government.' '
In the view of the UN, Portugal, and a majority of member states,
East Timor would fall in the first category: a non-self-governing ter-
ritory, seeking external self-determination. East Timor remained on
the United Nation's list of non-self-goveming territories throughout
Indonesia's occupation."2 Portugal, technically East Timor's admin-
istrator,' 3 took the position that Indonesia interfered with East
Timor's right to make a free choice."' The European Union, the
United States, Canada, and Japan, among others, have stated that
East Timor's right to self-determination as a former colony was not
realized through incorporation with Indonesia. '
In the view of Indonesia and a minority of states, East Timor
would fall in the second category: a territory of Indonesia seeking
self-government, or internal self-determination. According to Indo-
nesia, the East Timorese exercised their right to self-determination in
1976, when the government of Indonesia sponsored a "Regional
Popular Assembly.""' From that date, Australia and a few other
states considered the question of East Timor to be an internal Indo-
110. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4. at 18 (defining external self-determination as
enabling the population of a territory to decide f'eely whether to join an existing
state or become an independent and sovereign state).
111. See id. (arguing that internal self-determination enables the people of a
country to choose their political, social, and economic institutions or to make im-
portant constitutional or political decisions.).
112. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 230 (arguing that the fact East Timor re-
mained on the UN's non-self-governing territory list was evidence that the UN did
not recognize Indonesia's occupation of East Timor).
113. See id. at 225 (noting Portugal's consistent claim under the UN Charter to
be able to speak on East Timor's behalf as the non-self-governing territory's ad-
ministering power).
114. See id. (providing the view of Portugal that Indonesia's integration of East
Timor denied the "'free and genuine will" of the East TimoreseL.
115. See CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at xxv (listing the states that
recognized East Timor's right to self-determination aflter Indonesia's occupation of
the territory).
116. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 225-26 (providing Indonesia's view that
East Timor's opportunity to exercise external self-determination had passed).
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nesian matter.'1 7
B. ENFORCING SELF-DETERMINATION: ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
Whether external or internal, self-determination is normally exer-
cised through democratic means."8 Inter-governmental organizations
("IGOs"), non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), and/or the UN
have each played a role in ensuring such elections are free and fair."9
The level of involvement an IGO, NGO, or the UN employs in pro-
viding assistance depends on the specific circumstances surrounding
a particular election."20
The UN's procedure for determining the achievement of external
self-determination requires that a non-self-governing territory freely
choose: 1) independence; 2) association with an independent state; or
3) integration with an independent state.' In the case of association
or integration, the choice must be expressed through "informed and
democratic processes."'' 22 Under General Assembly Resolution 1541,
the UN reserves the right to supervise elections in non-self-
governing territories as it deems necessary to ensure such elections
are conducted freely and fairly.
2
1
Once reserved for external self-determination elections, the UN
117. See id. at 229-30 (explaining that Australia and others accepted the "reali-
ties" in East Timor, concluding Indonesia's actual control rendered the situation to
be internal).
118. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 18 (stating that both forms of self-
determination require some form of democracy).
119. See id. at 34-36 (noting the different roles of IGOs, NGOs, and the UN in
various missions).
120. See id. at 39-41 (describing the different sizes of observer missions, which
are based on varied criteria and providing examples of such criteria).
121. See Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or
Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73e
of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1467, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 15th Sess., Annex.,
Agenda Item 38, Prin. VI at 12, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960) (setting out the require-
ments for a non-self-governing territory to reach a full measure of self-
government, guaranteed by Article 73e of the UN Charter).
122. Id. Prin. VII(a) at 12, IX(b) at 13.
123. See id. Prin. IX(b)at 13 (requiring that integration with a state may only be




has expanded its electoral assistance to independent states.'" How-
ever, out of respect for state sovereignty, ' 25 the UN will not monitor
elections without the consent of a country's existing government.'
Such consent must be demonstrated through written request by the
government requiring UN electoral assistance.'
The UN's treatment of East Timor is a hybrid of the external and
internal self-determination electoral assistance models. On the one
hand, the UN repeatedly affirmed East Timor's right to external self-
determination as a non-self-governing territory.'' Yet, when Indone-
sia invaded the territory and declared integration,' " the UN failed to
supervise an election"" as allowed by General Assembly Resolution
124. See id. at 717-18 (noting the shift from UN election monitoring in the de-
colonization period to UN electoral assistance with internal self-determination
elections). The UN has lent electoral assistance to over 50 independent states in the
last decade. See Member States' Requests ]or Electoral .Assstance to the Unted
Nations System, available at <http:www.un.org, Depts dpa ead, websit. I 0.htm>
[hereinafter Requests] providing an alphabetical list of countries that have re-
quested UN electoral assistance, and noting the UN response to each request).
125. The UN is careful not to involve itself in the internal matters of states. See
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1, 7 (respecting the sovereignty of member states and
curtailing UN intervention into matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state").
126. See Guidelines for Member States Considering the Fornulation of Re-
quests for Electoral Assistance, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.. Annex 3, Agenda Item
100(b), paras. 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/49/675 (1994) [hereinafter UN Election Monitor-
ing Guidelines] (noting "national sovereignty" as a primary concern of the UN in
conducting elections).
127. See id. Annex III, para. 3 (requiring a formal, written request from the in-
dependent state's government as one of the preconditions for UN electoral assis-
tance). The other precondition for UN electoral assistance is the determination of a
requesting government's needs through a UN-sponsored needs assessment mis-
sion. See id. at Annex III, para. 4 (explaining that a needs assessment mission is
necessary to determine whether conditions for a free and fair election are present
in the requesting country). For an in depth explanation of each type of electoral
assistance the UN may provide, see Sattherthwaite. supra note 7, at 741-51 (ana-
lyzing the seven types of UN electoral assistance: organization and conduct, su-
pervision, verification, coordination for international observers, support for na-
tional observers, observation, and technical assistance).
128. See discussion supra Part I.B (chronicling the UN's unchanging view that
East Timor was a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-determination).
129. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 225 (noting July 17, 1976 as the date Indo-
nesia established East Timor as its twenty-seventh province).
130. See id. (arguing that the UN rejected Indonesia's in% itation to supervise the
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1541.'"' Instead, the UN chose to enforce East Timor's right to self-
determination twenty five years later through the internal model of
formal written request. '
1. Types of UN Electoral Assistance: Standard vs. Major
While the circumstances surrounding each electoral assistance re-
quest are different, the Electoral Assistance Division' has identified
and developed a set of UN electoral assistance models.14 Depending
on the nature of the request for electoral assistance, the UN has the
option to decline.'3' Otherwise, the UN may provide standard elec-
toral assistance or commit to a major electoral mission.'' Standard
1976 election in East Timor because doing so would have endorsed Indonesia's
invasion of the territory).
131. See Principles which Should Guide Members in Determining whether or
not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for under Article 73e
of the Charte, 16 December 1960, G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 948th plen. mtg.,
Prin. IX(b) (1960) (reserving the right of the UN to ensure that non-self-governing
territories make a free and informed choice when considering integration with an
independent state).
132. See discussion supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text (distinguishing
the internal self-determination electoral model from the external model, in that the
internal model requires a written request, while the external model does not).
133. The UN Electoral Assistance Division was established following a General
Assembly Resolution that encouraged the need for a UN body to oversee the con-
sideration of requests for UN electoral assistance. See Enhancing the Effectiveness
of the Principal of Periodic and Genuine Elections, G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., 75th mtg., paras. 9, 11 (1992) (endorsing the Secretary-
General's plan to appoint an official to streamline the electoral assistance process
and requesting the Secretary-General to provide a small staff to assist the official
in considering and implementing electoral assistance requests).
134. See generally UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, at An-
nex III, paras. 1-2(explaining that the guidelines for electoral assistance were cre-
ated to "assist Member States in formulating requests" for electoral assistance, to
"outline the various types of assistance that might be provided," and to determine
"the conditions necessary for the United Nations to undertake such involvement").
135. See id. annex III, paras. 3-5 (setting out the preconditions for electoral as-
sistance; if these are not met, the UN may decline a request).
136. See Sattherthwaite, supra note 7, at 741 (identifying two categories for the
seven UN electoral assistance models: "standard set of low lower-level assistance"
and "less widely used major missions"). The United Nations Department of Politi-
cal Affairs provides a concise definition of each model on the UN website. See
Main Types of Assistance Activities, avaliable at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/website3.htm> [hereinafter Main Types] (di-
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missions, which are normally small in scale, include the coordination
and support of international observers, support for national observ-
ers, limited observation and technical assistance. " Major UN elec-
toral assistance missions are generally larger than standard mis-
sions."' Usually part of a peacekeeping mandate, major missions
require authorization from either the General Assembly or the Secu-
rity Council.'40 Major electoral missions include the verification, su-
pervision, or organization and conduct of an electoral process. 4
a. Standard Missions
Standard UN electoral missions are often employed in conjunction
with the efforts of IGOs, NGOs, and/or a requesting state's electoral
authorities. After considering a request for electoral assistance, the
UN may choose to coordinate other international organizations to
monitor an electoral process,'4"2 support election observers within an
viding UN electoral assistance into the two categories of standard and major elec-
toral assistance, and defining each model: coordination and support of interna-
tional observers, technical assistance, support for national election monitors, lim-
ited observation, organization and conduct. supervision, and verification).
137. See discussion infi-a notes 144-147 and accompanying text (defining the
four types of standard UN electoral assistance missions).
138. See Main Types, supra note 136 (determining standard missions to be small
in scale when compared with major missions).
139. See id. ("[S]uch missions are normally a central element of comprehensive
peacekeeping operations that include an electoral component."). For a definition of
peacekeeping, see supra note 2.
140. See Main Tpes, supra note 136 ("Major electoral missions require a man-
date from the General Assembly or Security Council and are considered excep-
tional activities of the Organization).
141. See discussion hifra notes 160-162 and accompanying text (defining the
three types of major UN electoral assistance missions).
142. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, paras. 11-12 (de-
fining "coordination of international observers").
At the request of the Government. the United Nations may establish a small
coordinating secretariat to support all international observers invited by the
Government. This secretariat ... provides an umbrella framework within
which international observers receive protocol, logistical and observation
support.... In this case the United Nations maintains a somewhat lower po-
litical profile... while providing effective support for an important political
process.
Id. The UN has provided coordination and support for international observers in
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existing state, 43 send UN observers to monitor the end of an electoral
process,'- or provide technical assistance.' The coordination of in-
ternational observers involves bringing a diverse group of interna-
tional observers from IGOs and NGOs together in order to stream-
line the election monitoring process.' 46 The UN provides these
groups with training and a forum to report their observations.' 7 If
needed, the UN provides similar support to national election observ-
Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Sierra
Leone, Mali, Algeria, and other requesting states. See Support by the United Na-
tions System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or
Restored Democracies: Report of the Secretai'-General, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 41, at Sec. III U.N. Doc. A/50/322 (1995) [hereinafter
Support Efforts] (providing the states where the UN has offered coordination and
support for international observers).
143. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, para. 13 (defining
"support for national observers"). "This approach .... emphasizes the importance
of long-term national capacity-building and the strengthening of national institu-
tions." Id. The UN provided support for national observers in Mexico and Mozam-
bique. See id. para. 14 (comparing assistance in Mexico and Mozambique under
this model).
144. See id. para. 16 (defining "observation"). "In special cases, a United Na-
tions observer or a small team may be sent to follow an electoral process and pro-
vide an internal report to the Secretary-General on the general conduct of the elec-
tion." Id.
145. See id. para. 17 (defining "technical assistance").
Technical assistance is the most frequently requested form of United Nations
electoral assistance. Such assistance can be classified into three general cate-
gories: those which contribute to national capacity-building through the es-
tablishment of new electoral institutions or strengthening of existing capabili-
ties; those which relate to the human rights aspects of the electoral process;
and those which provide specific legal, constitutional, logistic or technical
advice as well as various types of electoral equipment and supplies.
Id.
146. See id. para. 11 (explaining that the coordination of multiple organizations
under the UN umbrella allows the individuals and groups the opportunity to "bene-
fit from a more comprehensive view of the electoral process and prepare assess-
ments based on a larger data basis than individual observations would allow"). For
a list of the different organizations that have developed to address electoral assis-
tance needs, see Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at n. 142 (noting the work of these or-
ganizations is similar to that of the UN's Electoral Assistance Division).
147. See id. (noting that the different observer groups are briefed together before





ers or, in rare cases, send UN election observers. "'
The most common type of UN electoral assistance, and the least
intrusive, is technical assistance. TM It is often used in conjunction
with other types of UN electoral assistance missions, and assistance
ranges from providing electoral advice to providing actual electoral
materials.'"' Electoral advice includes instruction on designing an
electoral system, drafting electoral law, training poll workers, and
ensuring electoral security.'" Materials the UN may lend through
technical assistance include ballots, ballot boxes, and permanent ink
for the ballots.'53
b. Major Missions
While standard electoral missions involve international organiza-
tions and requesting states with minimal UN involvement, major
missions require the opposite. "4 In a major mission, the UN trades its
peripheral advisory role for a more active one." As a result, major
missions are more intrusive than standard missions and require either
General Assembly or Security Council authorization.' Unlike stan-
148. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, paras. 13-15 (ex-
plaining that support for national election observers involves strengthening pre-
existing election structures and can be adjusted to meet the needs of the requesting
state).
149. See id. para. 16 (claiming that this type of mission is minimally efTectwe
and, therefore, is rarely authorized).
150. See supra note 145 (defining technical assistance).
151. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines. supra note 126, para. 1S (enumer-
ating examples of the different types of technical assistance that the UN has pro-
vided to the electoral authorities of requesting states).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See Main Types, supra note 136 (arguing that unlike standard missions,
major electoral missions are exceptional and require a mandate from the General
Assembly of the Security Council).
155. See Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at 742-47 (defining, supervision, organiza-
tion and conduct, and verification missions, and arguing that these mission are in-
vasive of state sovereignty).
156. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines. supra note 126, para. 7 (requiring
that major operations obtain a "formal mandate" from either the Security Council
or the General Assembly).
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dard missions, major missions involve large numbers of UN person-
nel and often last for long periods of time. 1 7 Major missions include
supervision, 5' verification, " or the organization and conduct of an
electoral process."'
Supervision involves UN certification of an external self-detemintion" " 161
determination election. In a supervision mission, the UN oversees
each stage of the election process and guarantees that the elections
take place in an environment free of fear and intimidation.' ' If
157. See id. paras. 8-10 (requiring a minimum of eighteen months lead time for
organization and conduct missions, calling supervision missions "long-term," and
requiring "extensive chronological coverage" for verification missions).
158. See id. para. 9 (defining "supervision of an electoral process").
Supervisory operations, generally undertaken in the context of decolonization,
require the United Nations to certify all stages of an electoral process in order
to assure its ultimate legitimacy. Such operations are therefore long-term and
require substantial personnel and material resources. They are often under-
taken in the context of larger peace-keeping operations. Such assistance is not
normally provided to Member States, as such activity infringes on the sover-
eignty of the State.
Id.
159. See id. para. 10 (defining "verification of an electoral process"). These
guidelines state:
[i]n the case of verification operations, the United Nations is requested to
verify the freedom and fairness of specific aspects of the electoral process
conducted by the national election authority. Because the United Nations is
expected to make a final statement on the conduct of the elections, verifica-
tion must cover all relevant aspects of the electoral process, thus requiring
extensive chronological and geographical coverage. Similar to supervision,
verification missions must be mandated by the Security Council or General
Assembly and may be one element in a broader peace-keeping mission.
Id.
160. See id. para. 8 (defining "organization and conduct of an electoral proc-
ess").
This type of assistance is most complex[.] ... Owing to the significant lead
time required (a minimum of 18 months), as well as the substantial financial,
personnel and material resources needed for such an operation, this type of
assistance will rarely be mandated.
Id.
161. See Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at 742 (explaining that supervision mis-
sions are limited to non-self-governing territories undergoing decolonization).
162. See id. (discussing the UN's use of a Status of Mission Agreement).
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abuses occur, UN personnel are authorized to request corrective
measures."' In order to carry out such a mission, the UN requires a
large staff and ample time to prepare."' For example, the United Na-
tions Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia was com-
prised of nearly 8,000 people. "5 Over ten years passed before the UN
allowed the elections to take place.'
Verification is the supervision equivalent for internal self-
determination elections.'6' The UN conducts verification missions at
the request of an independent state's government."' Like supervi-
sion, verification missions involve UN certification of the entire
election process.' 69 For example, in 1992, Mozambique requested UN
These agreements are used to certify the impartiality of electoral authorities
the impartiality of electoral authorities: the freedom of organization, move-
ment, assembly, and expression of political parties and alliances; the possi-
bility of parties to be present at all stages of the process: the fairness of access
to state-owned media; and insurance that election rolls are properly drawn
and qualified voters are not denied access to voting cards.
Id.
163. See id. at 743 (explaining that UN personnel must report abuses under a
Status of Mission Agreement and the authorities are obligated to respond).
164. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines. supra note 126, para. 9 (stating
that "[s]uch operations are ... long-term and require substantial personnel[.]"); see
also Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at 743 (emphasizing that these types of missions
require at least four months for preparation)
165. See Satterthwaite, supra note 7. at 743 (noting UNTAG's composition of
nearly 2,000 civilians, 1,500 civilian police, and almost 4.500 military personnel).
166. See RATNER, supra note 2, at 118-19 (noting that the 10 year delay in
UNTAG's deployment allowed the UN substantial lead time to prepare the mis-
sion and lay a political foundation).
167. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines. supra note 126, para. 10 (noting
that verification missions are similar to supervision missions because they both re-
quire Security Council or General Assembly mandates, and are usually part of a
larger peacekeeping operation).
168. See id. para. 3 (explaining that verification missions depend on the request
from a sovereign state for the UN to verify the "freedom and fairness" of the
state's electoral authority's practices).
169. See Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at 745-46 (noting that verification mis-
sions, like supervision missions, require a Status of Mission agreement.) These
Mission agreements are designed to create:
impartiality of the electoral authorities: the freedom of organization, move-
ment, assembly, and expression of political parties and alliances. the possi-
bility of parties to be present at all stages of the process; the fairness of access
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electoral assistance to help resolve an entrenched civil war."" In re-
sponse, the Security Council established the United Nations Opera-
tion in Mozambique ("ONUMOZ"),17' a large peacekeeping force
with an electoral assistance mandate.' 72 ONUMOZ oversaw the entire
election process in Mozambique and verified the results.1
7
1
The final and most complex major UN electoral mission is organi-
zation and conduct.174 In supervision and verification missions the
UN oversees the electoral process as local authorities carry it out,'
but in organization and conduct missions, the UN becomes the elec-
tion administrator.'76 In this role, the UN normally establishes the
polling procedures, informs the public, carries out the election, and
ensures security.' 7 Organization and conduct missions require more
to state-owned media; and insurance that election rolls are properly drawn,
[and] qualified voters are not denied access to voting cards.
Id.
170. See General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at
3, U.N. Doc. S/24635/Annex (1992) [hereinafter General Peace Agreement] (re-
questing UN involvement in resolving a civil war in Mozambique).
171. See S.C. Res. 797, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/797, para. 2
(1992) (establishing ONUMOZ).
172. See id. para. 6 (discussing the electoral aspects of the mission, based on the
Secretary-General's report, dated December 2, 1992).
173. See S.C. Res. 960, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/960 (1994)
(endorsing the results of the October 1994 Mozambican elections, and determining
that the elections were free and fair).
174. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, para. 8 (calling
organization and conduct assistance the "most complex"). To date, the UN has
only completed missions under this model in Cambodia and Croatia, with a mis-
sion in the Western Sahara in abeyance. See Requests, supra note 124 (listing the
UN responses to all state requests for electoral assistance, and showing that the UN
only responded with organization and conduct missions to Cambodia, Eastern Sla-
vonia (Croatia), East Timor, and Western Sahara, now in abeyance).
175. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, paras. 9-10 (not-
ing the role of the UN in these missions is to assure the legitimacy of elections
controlled by local electoral authorities).
176. See Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at 743 (explaining that in organization and
conduct missions, the UN undertakes the responsibilities normally carried out by
local election authorities).
177. See id. (noting that the mission's mandate is to oversee the entire election
process, including the "establishment of a system of laws, procedures, and admin-
istrative mechanisms for the elections, followed by the actual administration of the
elections by U.N. personnel.").
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time to prepare and a significantly larger staff than any other elec-
toral assistance mission.' The Secretary General suggests that or-
ganization and conduct missions have a lead-time of at least eighteen
months.' 79 The UN's organization and conduct mission in Cambodia
(UNTAC) employed over 20,000 UN personnel and lasted the re-
quired eighteen months.'80
2. UNAMET: An Organization and Conduct Mission?
Curiously, the UN Electoral Assistance Division labels UNAMET
an organization and conduct mission."' In some respects, UNAMET
would qualify. As with other organization and conduct missions, the
Security Council created UNAMET to monitor the fairness of the
election, establish voting procedures, and educate voters. " In this
capacity, the mission was successful."'X
In the areas of size, time, and security, however, UNAMET differs
from its organization and conduct mission predecessors. To date the
Security Council has only authorized organization and conduct mis-
sions in Cambodia (UNTAC), Croatia (UNTAES), and Western Sa-
hara (MINURSO) now in abeyance."' These missions were larger, '
178. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines. supra note 126, paras. 4, 8 (ex-
plaining that due to the substantial time, cost, and personnel associated with or-
ganization and conduct missions, the UN rarely undertakes them).
179. See id.
180. See Nhan T. Vu, The Holding qf Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia:
The Achievement of the United Nations' Impossible Mission, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1177, 1187 (1995) (summarizing UNTAC's performance in Cambodia and noting
that the mission began arriving late in 1991 and the elections were declared suc-
cessful approximately eighteen months later).
181. See Requests, supra note 124 (identifying the UN response to East Timor
request for electoral assistance an "organization and conduct of popular consulta-
tion"). See also S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, para. I (deciding to establish
UNAMET to "organize and conduct a popular consultation").
182. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, para. 4 (agreeing that UNAMET should
incorporate a political component to monitor fairness, an electoral component for
voting procedures, and an information component to explain the procedures to the
voting public).
183. See East Timnorese Reject Autonony, supra note 17 (statement of Kofi An-
nan, Secretary-General, United Nations) (recognizing the August 30 election out-
come to be free and fair).
184. See Requests, supra note 124 (listing the UN responses to all state requests
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took more time to establish, 116 and involved UN control over secuI-
rity.'17 For example, UNTAC required the efforts of over 20,000 UN
for electoral assistance, and showing that the UN only responded with organization
and conduct missions to Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), East Timor, and
Western Sahara, now in abeyance).
185. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA: 1991-1995
23 (United Nations, Department of Public Information) (1995) (discussing the size
of UNTAC, which included 15,991 military personnel and 3,359 civilian police at
its peak); United Nations Department of Public Information, Cambodia-UNTAC:
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (updated Aug. 31, 1996)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untac-e.htm> [hereinafter Cambodia-
UNTAC] (listing the strength of the mission as "approximately 22,000 military and
civilian personnel"). Considering Cambodia's population, there was roughly one
UNTAC staff member for every 600 Cambodian citizens. See CIA, World
Factbook 1999 (last modified July, 1999) <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/hr.html#people> (reporting Cambodia's population to be 11,626,520 as
of July 1999). But see United Nations Department of Public Information, Croatia-
UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Ba-
raija and Western Sirmium (last modified Jan. 15, 1988) <http://www.un.org/
Depts/DPKO/Missions/untaese.htm> [hereinafter Croatia-UNTAES] (discussing
the size of UNTAES at its full deployment, which included over 5,000 uniformed
personnel). The rough ratio for UNTAES personnel to Croatia's population would
be approximately 1:935, which is proportionally smaller than the UNAMET man-
date. See CIA, The World Faetbook 1999 (last modified July 1999)
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/cb.html#people> (reporting Croa-
tia's population to be 4,676,864 as of July 1999); CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra
note 26, at xix (reporting the East Timorese population to be 700,000 in 1997).
Since UNAMET's mandate was approximately 900, the UN personnel-population
ratio for the mission was approximately 1:775. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14,
paras. 2,3 (authorizing the deployment of the 280 civilian police advisors and 50
military liaisons); Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
Doe. S/1999/705, para. 3 (1999) (planning to send 400 field electoral officers East
Timor). The discrepancy in size between UNTAES and UNTAC does not under-
mine the fact that UNTAES was better able to carry out its mission due to a longer
mandate and a security component. See discussion infra notes 192-193 and ac-
companying text (considering the time allotment and security components of other
organization and conduct missions).
186. See supra note 185 (explaining that UNTAC lasted eighteen months);
Croatia-UNTAES, supra note 185 (providing a chronology of UNTAES, which
shows that the electoral portion of the peacekeeping mission took approximately
15 months to carry out).
187. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA: 1991-1995, supra note 185, at
12-14, 23 (discussing UNTAC's security component, along with the peacekeeping




personnel,' while UNAMET unsuccessfully relied on only about
900. '89 In regards to time, the Secretary General advises an eighteen
month lead time to prepare for an organization and conduct mis-
sion,'9" but only allotted a little more than two months to
UNAMET. 191
The most glaring difference between UNAMET and other organi-
zation and conduct missions lies in the security provisions. UNTAC
and UNTAES called on UN security forces to enforce the peace,
but the UNAMET police contingent was restricted to providing ad-
vice to Indonesian security forces and reporting security breaches to
the Secretary General."' UNAMET's restricted security function
more closely resembled what would occur in a supervision or verifi-
cation mission.94
188. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA: 1991-1995, supra note 185, at
23 (noting the size of UNTAC).
189. UNAMET's deployment included 280 ci% tian police advisors, 50 military
liaison officers, and 400 field electoral officers. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14,
paras. 2, 3 (authorizing the deployment of the advisors and liaisons); U.N. Doc.
S/1999/705, supra note 185, para. 3 (providing a plan for UNAMET to the Secu-
rity Council, which included sending the 400 field electoral officers to 200 regis-
tration centers located throughout East Timor).
190. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines. supra note 126 (noting the eight-
een-month lead time for organization and conduct missions) See also supra note
185 (showing that the other UN organization and conduct missions fell within this
requirement).
191. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14. para. I (establishing UNAMET on June
11, 1999 to "organize and conduct the popular consultation" and remain in East
Timor until August 31, 1999).
192. See Letter Dated 30 October 1991 fr'om the Permanent Representatives of
France and Idonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. Annex 1, § C. U.N. Doc. A46,608, S 21377 (1991)
[hereinafter Cambodian Settlement Agreement] (outlining the military responsi-
bilities of UNTAC, which included enforcing a cease-fire, banning military aid,
demobilizing the armed forces of Cambodia's four factions, and consolidating
these into one Cambodian force): S.C. Res. 1037. U.N. SCOR. 51st Sess., para. 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 (1996) (creating UNTAES with a military and civilian
component).
193. See discussion infra Part IV.A (setting forth the provisions of the May 5
Agreements).
194. See UN Election Monitoriig Guidelines. siqra note 126, paras. 9-10 (re-
quiring the UN to "certify" all stages of an electoral process and "make a final
statement on the conduct" of a particular election).
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III. LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS OF
ENFORCING SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
While the seven types of UN electoral assistance listed above are
structured to provide the enforcement of self-determination, legal
and political factors limit the UN's ability to achieve success in
every case. Without the consent of the parties, the UN is legally
bound to refrain from intervention,' " with the exception of peace en-
forcement. 9 6 Without the political support of member states, the UN
is unable to act on behalf of people seeking the right of self-
determination. 
97
A. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS - CONSENT
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter prohibits the Organiza-
tion from "intervening in matters which are basically within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state." '"8 The General Assembly articulated
the UN's duty to respect Article 2(7) of the Charter in its 1996 reso-
lution, Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-
interference in the Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral Proc-
esses:
[E]lectoral assistance to Member States should be provided by the United
Nations only at the request and with the consent of specific sovereign
States, by virtue of resolutions adopted by the Security Council or the
General Assembly in each case, in strict conformity with the principles of
sovereignt), and non-interference in the internal affairs of States[.]'" (em-
phasis added)
195. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para 7. ("[B]ut this principle [of non-intervention]
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.").
196. See id. ("[B]ut this principal [of non-intervention] shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.")
197. See discussion infra Part III.B. (noting the importance of political support
by member states in enforcing self-determination, especially in the case of East
Timor).
198. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para 7.




Thus, the UN requires a formal written request for all forms of elec-
toral assistance.00
The May 5 Agreements constituted Portugal and Indonesia's
written request for electoral assistance and consent to a UN pres-
ence.20 ' The parties requested the UN to organize and conduct the
popular consultation in East Timor, but, unlike any predecessor or-
ganization and conduct request, limited consent to the logistical as-
pects of carrying out the election.2' Despite the Secretary General's
attempts to negotiate complete UN control of the process, Indonesia
refused to consent to UN-controlled security.:" Under the internal
model of required consent, the UN had to respect this limitation. :
There are two exceptions to the consent requirement for UN elec-
toral assistance. The UN may choose to intervene without consent
for external self-determination elections : ' or as part of a peace en-
forcement mission.2 1' As the UN has regarded East Timor a non-self-
governing territory with the right to external self-determination,'"" the
200. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, para. 3 (requiring
written consent as a precondition for any type of UN electoral assistance).
201. See General Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 1-2, 4 (requesting the Secre-
tary-General to consult the East Timorese regarding the autonomy proposal, estab-
lish UNAMET to carry out the mission, and report the popular consultation's re-
sults).
202. See id. art. 3 (determining that Indonesia would be responsible for provid-
ing security during the consultation, thus limiting UNAMET's responsibilities to
the provisions of the Modalities Agreement); Modalities Agreement, supra note
11, §1 l§ E-G (enumerating UNAMET's responsibilities and leaving out any sub-
stantive security duties); Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 4 (assigning se-
curity responsibility singly to the Indonesian police).
203. Steven Mufson & Colum Lynch, E. Timor Failure Pits L *.N. on the Spot;
Interventionist Ability in Doubt, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1999, at A I (discussing the
negotiations proceeding the May 5 Agreements, where the Indonesian government
scratched out the sections of an original UN draft that restricted Indonesian secu-
rity forces).
204. See discussion supra notes 198-200 (explaining the reasoning behind the
required consent policy of UN election monitoring).
205. See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 131, Prin IX(b) (allowing the UN to super-
vise elections for self-determination in non-self-governing territories).
206. See discussion infra note 259 and accompanying text (explaining that ille-
gal occupation justifies UN peace enforcement under UN law).
207. See discussion supra notes 32-34, 52-57 and accompanying text (noting the
UN's declarations that East Timor is a non-self-governing territory with the right
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Organization faced no legal bar to enforcing East Timor's right."*19
Likewise, Indonesia's illegal use of force in occupying East Timor
was legally sufficient to authorize peace enforcement under the
Charter. 09
B. POLITICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND UN ELECTION
MONITORING
While legal factors did not effectively preclude the UN from en-
forcing East Timor's right to self-determination, political factors left
the UN unable to act without Indonesia's consent. In order to under-
take any sort of mission, the UN relies upon support from key mem-
210ber states. ° Prior to Indonesia's consent, no one in the international
community, with the exception of Portugal,2t ' took affirmative steps
to enforce East Timor's right to self-determination. 2" As with other
matters of international law, the international community declined to
enforce East Timor's right to self-determination because doing so
would not have served the political interests of member states."'
to self-determination).
208. See G.A. Res. 1541 supra note 131 (containing no provisions requiring
consent of an administrator or occupying state).
209. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
210. See RATNER, supra note 2, at 36 (explaining, in the context of peacekeep-
ing, that even when the UN has the consent of the parties, key member states must
give concur before the Organization can undertake a mission of any type). For ex-
ample, in order for the UN Security Council to authorize a peace enforcement mis-
sion, at least 9 members must agree and all the permanent members must concur.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3) (explaining that, aside from procedural matters, such
a voting requirement is mandatory before the Security Council can act on any
matter).
211. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 223 (noting Portugal's effort to support
East Timor's right to self-determination by bringing the case before the ICJ); see
also Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austrl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
212. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 223 (listing the reasons why the interna-
tional community, including the UN, did not assist East Timor).
213. See id. at 227 (arguing that the UN failed to enforce East Timor's right to
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Antonio Cassese2 14 cites international political concerns as responsi-
ble for enabling Indonesia's continued occupation of East Timor. "
He argues that Indonesia was of great strategic importance to the
West..2 ' The United States admitted as much, stating that enforcing
self-determination in East Timor "would not serve [the United
States'] best interests in light of the importance of [United States]
relations with Indonesia."2t ' Similarly, the European Union never
took an affirmative stance on enforcing East Timor's right to self-
determination, avoiding the question of East Timor altogether. ""
Cassese believes that without strong support in the West the UN
could not answer the question.2" Thus, technically available interna-
self-determination based on political considerations).
214. Cassese, a well-respected international legal scholar and President of the
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, has written extensively on the subject of self-
determination and its evolving applications. These works include: ANTONIO
CASSESE, Political Seif-Deterinination-Old Concepts and Vew Developments, in
UN LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: Two ToPics IN INT-RNATIO\AL L.\\w 137 (An-
tonio Cassese ed., 1979); see also CASSESE, supra note 60.
215. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 227 (arguing that political considerations
prompted the UN Security Council to avoid labeling the 1975 Indonesian invasion
of East Timor a breach of international peace and security).
216. See id. at 227 (arguing that Western member states refused to lend support
because they derived no direct benefit from assisting East Timor and intervention
could potentially harm relations with Indonesia). For example. the importance of
Indonesia to the United States may be summarized by the following statement:
Indonesia is the largest country in the Association of South East Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), support for which is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in South-
east Asia. It is a moderate voice in the developing world, an important oil
producer and a major arena for U.S. trade and investment, and it occupies a
strategic position astride vital sea lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific
Oceans.
Situation in East Tinor, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 29, No%. 1982, reprinted in
CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 313 (statement of John H. Holdndge,
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).
217. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 227 (quoting the testimony of United States
Deputy Legal Adviser, George H. Aldrich, before the House of Representatives"
Subcommittee on International Organizations).
218. See id. at 228 (arguing that most member states of the European Union
view the question of East Timor as a bilateral matter to be dealt with by Portugal
and Indonesia). But see generally CAMBRIDGE DOCUMENTS, suqra note 26, at 302-
12 (providing Council of Europe and European Parliament documents (reprinted)
that condemn Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and call for intervention).
219. See CASSESE, supra note 60, at 223 (arguing that %% ithout political support
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tional legal remedies remained out of reach without Indonesia's con-
sent.
2 °
IV. THE MAY 5 AGREEMENTS
Progress toward finding a remedy for the people of East TimorA . 221
came with the signing of the May 5 Agreements. Given the history
and politics surrounding the territory, the signing of the May 5
Agreements was an historic event.122 The provisions of the May 5
Agreements seem to indicate the parties' sincere intent to provide a
free and fair election and to respect human rights.22 However, inher-
ent flaws in the May 5 Agreements, specifically the security provi-
sions, made the protection of human rights in East Timor impossible.
A. THE PROVISIONS OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENTS
1. Indonesian Responsibility
The plan for the East Timorese popular consultation, established
by the May 5 Agreements, stressed the importance of maintaining
security before, during, and after the vote.2 4 The drafters believed
security was necessary to ensure a fair popular consultation "in an
atmosphere free of intimidation, violence, or interference from any
from the US in particular, the UN could not assist East Timor).
220. See discussion supra Part III.
221. See May 5 Agreements Press Conference, supra note 13 (statement of Kofi
Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations) (announcing that Portugal, Indonesia,
and the UN had concluded talks on the question of East Timor, deciding on a solu-
tion through the popular consultation).
222. Id.
223. See GeneralAgreement, supra note 10, art. 3 (expressing Indonesia's intent
to ensure a "fair" and "peaceful" consultation); Modalities Agreement, supra note
11 (enumerating the procedures UNAMET would later undertake to provide a fair
vote); Security Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 1-2 (recognizing the need for a se-
cure environment, calling for the neutrality of the Indonesian police forces, and
promising to abide by a code of conduct).
224. See General Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3 (assigning security responsi-
bility to Indonesia in order to guarantee a fair and peaceful vote); Modalities
Agreement, supra note 11, § G (outlining security provisions for each stage of the




side.' 25 The May 5 Agreements authorized Indonesia to maintain
peace and security before, during, and after the consultation proc-
ess. " 6 Article 3 of the General Agreement assigned security respon-
sibility to Indonesia generally.'-" Further, Section G of the Modalities
Agreement required the duty of Indonesian authorities to "ensure a
secure environment" for the consultation process and provide secu-
rity for UN personnel conducting the consultation. 2' Additionally,
Articles 1 and 4 of the Security Agreement gave Indonesian police
sole responsibility for the "maintenance of law and order.",
2. UN Role
The May 5 Agreements also defined the UN's role in carrying out
the consultation, including the necessity for a UN mission in East
Timor.2-0 In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 1246,
establishing the United Nations Mission in East Timor
("UNAMET").2' UNAMET's mandate satisfied Article 2 of the
Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, which requested the
Secretary General to establish "an appropriate United Nations Mis-
sion in East Timor to enable him to collectively carry out the popular
consultation. ' '2 2 Under paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution
225. See General Agreement, supra note 10. art. 3.
226. See id. (noting that "the Government of Indonesia will be responsible for
maintaining peace and security in East Timor."): Modlalities .4greenent, supra note
11, § G (discussing how "the Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure environ-
ment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the
security of United Nations personnel."): Securtty Agreement, supra note 12 (as-
serting that "responsibility to ensure [a secure] environment as well as for the gen-
eral maintenance of law and order rests with the appropnate Indonesian security
authorities.").
227. See GeneralAgreement, supra note 10. art. 3 (assigning the maintenance of
peace and security to Indonesia).
228. See Modalities Agreement, supra note 11. § G.
229. See Security Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 1. 4.
230. See General Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2 (requesting the Secretary-
General to establish a UN mission to help carry out the consultation process).
231. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14 (establishing UNAMET "in accordance
with the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-General to discharge his
responsibility under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement").
232. See General Agreement, supra note 10. par. 2.
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1246, UNAMET's duties in East Timor fell into three components:
(1) a political component; (2) an electoral component; and (3) an in-
formational component.233 The political component existed to moni-
tor fairness in the consultation process.3 Further, logistical tasks
connected with the vote, such as registration and polling, were con-
ducted through the electoral component.23 ' The informational com-
ponent also allowed for an impartial explanation of the options avail-
able to the East Timorese people, under Resolution 1246." 6 While
the UNAMET deployment included 280 civilian police and 50 mili-
tary liaison officers, UN personnel were not armed, nor were they in-
structed to enforce security. 237 The UN civilian police and military
officers served as advisors to Indonesian security officials under
Resolution 1246.38
B. PURPOSES OF THE MAY 5 AGREEMENTS
The May 5 Agreements have repercussions in the international
community as well as in East Timor.! Had their provisions been
implemented properly, they could have served as a model for future
election monitoring efforts for non-self-governing territories " " and
233. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, para. 4 (endorsing a proposal by the
Secretary-General that UNAMET's mandate should include a political, electoral,
and informational component).
234. See id. para. 4(a) (stating the purpose of the political component was to en-
sure freedom for political and non-governmental organizations to act freely).
235. See id. para. 4(b) (establishing the electoral component to be responsible
for registration and voting activities).
236. See id. para. 4(c) (providing for an information component, responsible for
the "objective and impartial" distribution of information about the vote).
237. See id. paras. 2-3 (authorizing the civilian police and military liaisons to
advise pollsters, supervise the ballot, and maintain contact with the Indonesian se-
curity forces). Resolution 1246 does not authorize any UNAMET officer to use
force. Id.
238. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, paras. 2-3 (limiting UNAMET's
authority).
239. See Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999
(citing the tragedy of East Timor as an example of the need for international inter-
vention).
240. See Trusteeship and Decolonization, 1996 U.N.Y.B. 516 (listing the former
colonies under consideration for the implementation of self-determination). The
Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Gibraltar, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Western Sahara,
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within independent states.24 ' First, the popular consultation envi-
sioned in the May 5 Agreements created a legal duty in the occupy-
ing state to respect the non-self-governing territory's wishes. f Un-
der the May 5 Agreements, if East Timor wished to pursue
independence, Indonesia had a legal obligation to withdraw from the
territory.43 Unlike past UN resolutions, which merely urged Indone-
sia to pull out of East Timor, the May 5 Agreements were binding!'"
Indonesia helped draft the May 5 Agreements and became a signa-
tory, thereby promising to respect the outcome of the vote.!
Secondly, the May 5 Agreements provided for UN control of the
modalities for the popular consultation, with the exception of secu-
rity enforcement. 246 The UN's role was essential in creating a free-
flow of information to the voters, which was intended to foster voter
participation and provide fair election results! " The Modalities
Agreement, and later Security Council Resolution 1246, required UN
staff to present impartial information to the East Timorese and make
sure the polling was conducted fairly.: " This was designed to prevent
and a number of small island territories have yet to exercise their right to self-
determination. Id.
241. See Requests, supra note 124 (providing a list of o~er 10 requests for
electoral assistance by independent states in the past ten years, thirteen of which
are either ongoing or under consideration).
242. See General Agreement, supra note 10, para. 6 (requiring lndonesia to re-
store East Timor's "non-self-governing" status under Indonesian law should the
voters reject the autonomy proposal).
243. See id.
244. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1 0)bJ
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining the consent to be
bound to a treaty).
245. See May 5 Agreements Press Cotiference, supra note 13 (noting Indone-
sia's participation in drafting the May 5 Agreements).
246. See Modalities Agreement, supra note II (describing UN preparation for
the popular consultation).
247. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14, para. 4(c) (establishing an information
component, responsible for the "objective and impartial" distribution of informa-
tion about the vote).
248. See Modalities Agreement, supra note 11, § E(a) (describing the informa-
fion distribution duties of UN personnel during the popular consultation); S.C. Res.
1246, supra note 14 (entrusting UNAMET with explaining the implications of
votes for or against the Indonesian proposal for a special autonomy).
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pro-independence or pro-integration factions from influencing the
outcome of the vote.249
Third, as mentioned above, the May 5 Agreements imposed le-
gally binding responsibilities on the government of Indonesia.
Through taking on primary security duties in East Timor during the
popular consultation process, Indonesia was legally obligated to re-
frain from its past practices of military intimidation and control of
the East Timorese people.2 ' Provisions in the May 5 Agreements
called for the "absolute neutrality of the Indonesian Armed Forces
and the Indonesian Police" thereby ensuring a peaceful environment
for the East Timorese to express their will.
2
Finally, the May 5 Agreements sought to foster a secure environ-
ment by allowing the UN to check the Indonesian security forces."
The Security Agreement provided that the consultation would not
take place unless "the necessary security situation exist[ed] for the
peaceful implementation of the consultation process."' 21" Paragraph 4
of the Security Agreement allowed the Secretary General to deter-
mine whether or not such a situation existed.2"
249. See Modalities Agreement, supra note 11, § E(c) (calling for the establish-
ment of a Code of Conduct for campaigning). Indonesia and Portugal could not
participate in the campaign process under the Modalities Agreement. Id.
250. See Vienna Convention, at Part II, sec. I (discussing the binding nature of
treaties and other international agreements).
251. See General Agreement, supra note 10, para. 3 (stating that "the Govern-
ment of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and security in East
Timor."); Modalities Agreement, supra note 11, § G ("The Indonesian authorities
will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process
and will be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel."); Security
Agreement, supra note 12, para. I ("Responsibility to ensure [a secure] environ-
ment as well as for the general maintenance of law and order rests with the appro-
priate Indonesian security authorities.").
252. Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 1.
253. See id. para. 3 (establishing that "prior to the start of registration, the Sec-
retary-General shall ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the UN mis-
sion, that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of
the consultation process.").
254. Id.
255. See id. (entrusting the Secretary-General to determine the necessary secu-
rity situation for a free and fair popular consultation in East Timor).
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C. FATAL FLAWS IN THE MAY 5 AGREEMENTS
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called the May 5 Agreements
"historic" at the conclusion of their signing.2 As previously men-
tioned, had the May 5 Agreements' provisions been properly imple-
mented, the 1999 East Timor consultation could have served as a
model for facilitating a peaceful process of self-determination in fu-
ture election monitoring efforts. Instead, due to inherent flaws in the
security provisions, an ambivalence toward lessons from past con-
sultations, and the failure to implement crucial portions of the May 5
Agreements, the 1999 East Timorese Consultation is a gross hu-
manitarian failure that calls into question the UN's policies on hu-
manitarian intervention.':'
1. Inadequate Security Provisions
Under the May 5 Agreements, Indonesia was solely responsible
for security during the popular consultation of East Timor.:" While
the UN's main purpose is to maintain international peace and secu-
rity,2- 9 the May 5 Agreements only allowed the international body to
256. See May 5 Agreements Press Conference, supra note 13 (expressing appre-
ciation to Indonesia and Portugal for signing the May 5 Agreements).
257. See Annan, supra note 239 (citing the tragedy of East Timor as an example
of the need for international intervention).
258. See General Agreement, supra note 10, pam. 3 ("The Government of Indo-
nesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and security in East Timor."); Mo-
dalities Agreement, supra note 11, § G ("The Indonesian authorities will ensure a
secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be re-
sponsible for the security of United Nations personnel."); Security .Agreement, sit-
pra note 12 ("Responsibility to ensure [a secure] environment as well as for the
general maintenance of law and order rests with the appropriate Indonesian secu-
rity authorities.").
259. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1 (establishing that the primary purpose of the UN
is to "maintain international peace and security")- hL (stating that the Security
Council can allow enforcement measures under Chapter VII if it finds a breach of
international peace and security). Chapter VII of the Charter assigns authority to
the Security Council to respond to potential or actual breaches of international
peace and security. See id. art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the ex-
istence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."); see
also id. art. 42 (allowing the Security Council to use force, should it determine
force a necessary measure to restore international peace and security).
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play a minimal security role.2 ° Many predicted that Indonesia would
not be able to fulfill its security duties due to its long history of
forceful occupation and threats of pro-integration militias."' How-
ever, aside from postponing the vote, the May 5 Agreements pro-
vided no alternative security measures in the event that Indonesia
should fail in its duties.262
a. Indonesia's Responsibilities
The May 5 Agreements' provisions that entrusted security to In-
donesian forces were inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
popular consultation: to provide a "free and fair ballot in East
Timor" in a "secure environment devoid of violence or other forms
of intimidation. ,2 63 During the talks that led up to the May 5 Agree-
ments, the parties ignored evidence that members of the Indonesian
security forces were at least unable, if not unwilling, to prevent acts
of violent aggression by pro-integration militias.2' A number of hu-
manitarian organizations brought this evidence to the UN's attention,
urging the UN to provide security instead of Indonesia. '
260. See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text (defining Indonesia's se-
curity responsibilities under the May 5 Agreements).
261. See Decolonization Committee Continues Consideration of East Timor,
avaliable at <http:www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999> [hereinafter Decoloniza-
tion Committee Hearings] (hearing arguments from human rights officials as to
why Indonesia should not have been trusted with providing security during the
consultation process).
262. See discussion infra Part IV.C. I.c (arguing that the security provisions
failed to include a contingency plan should Indonesia fail in its duties).
263. See General Agreement. supra note 10, para. 3.
264. See Decolonization Committee Hearings, supra note 261 (testimony from
Amnesty International representatives) (estimating that more than three hundred
East Timorese had died at the hands of pro-Indonesian militias since January
1999); id. (statement of the representative of the Catholic Institute for International
Relations) (arguing that the Indonesian army was supporting pro-Indonesian mili-
tia groups in a "proxy war" against pro-independence East Timorese).
265. See id. (statement of a representative of the Australian non-governmental
organization, Campaign for an Independent East Timor) (calling on the UN to ex-
clude Indonesia from the consultation process). Representatives from the Catholic
Church presented the Decolonization Committee with recent reports of "people
having their ears cut off and being forced to eat them." Id. But see id. (testimony of
Augusto Mendoca, speaking in his own capacity) (admitting that the pro-
Indonesian militias were hurting the peace process, but arguing that the Indonesian
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Aside from the overwhelming evidence that Indonesian forces
would be incapable of providing security, the assignment of security
to a biased party instantly made the process unfair.' Because of the
influence their political positions might create, Indonesia and Portu-
gal both agreed to stay uninvolved with the political, electoral, and
informational components of the consultation.' However, the Mo-
dalities Agreement's provision allowing Indonesian security forces
could have led to undue influence. ' "
b. The Weakness of UNAMET
The May 5 Agreements contained provisions which implied the
need for a peacekeeping force to ensure successful implementation
of the popular consultation. In response, the Security Council estab-
lished UNAIMET.26 However, the provisions that called for a UN
presence also clearly limited UNAMET's ability to prevent violence
in the region."" The small number of UNAMET personnel could
only report the violence that unfolded.:' Due to prohibitions of UN
government was taking positive steps toward a peaceful resolution).
266. See General Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3 (stressing the need for a
"fair" and "peaceful" consultation); Securin, Agreement, supra note 12, par. I
(requiring a "secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimida-
tion" to be necessary for a free and fair ballot).
267. See Modalities Agreement, supra note 11, § E(c) (stating that the govern-
ments of Indonesia and Portugal would not participate in the campaigning portion
of the popular consultation).
268. See id. § G (assigning the modalities to UNANIET. with the exception of
security).
269. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14 (expressing concern at the "tense and
volatile" situation in East Timor).
270. See Security Agreement, supra note 12. paras. 3-4 (noting that the UN mis-
sion would evaluate the security climate during the consultation process, provide
the Secretary-General with evaluations of the security climate, and advise Indone-
sian security forces).
271. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7 (stating that the UN has no authority to
intervene in matters which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state"). But see id. art. 2, para. 4 (allowing for enforcement measures should the
Security Council find a breach of international peace and security under Chapter
VII of the Charter). Chapter VII determines that when breaches to international
peace and security occur, the Security Council may take necessary action to
"maintain or restore international peace and security." See U.N. CHARTER art. 42
(authorizing the following actions to fall within Security Council authority: dem-
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intervention through force, UNAMET could do nothing to stop it.272
c. Inadequate Contingency Plan
Even if the presence of Indonesian security forces would not have
unduly influenced the popular consultation process, other problems
in the May 5 Agreements existed as well. Despite evidence that In-
donesian forces might not be able to secure peace in East Timor for
the popular consultation, the May 5 Agreements provided no alter-
native security measures.17 Certain provisions of the May 5 Agree-
ments allowed UN staff to monitor the elections,274 provide status re-
ports,275 and advise the Indonesian government on security
implementation,2 76 but none of the provisions allowed UNAMET to
respond to the real potential for violence.
77
Paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement did not serve as a suffi-
cient check on the Indonesian security forces' ability to provide ade-
quate safety during the consultation process.78 When the pro-
onstrations, blockades, "and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Mem-
bers of the United Nations."). Historical disagreement exists within the interna-
tional community as to whether or not East Timor was "within the domestic juris-
diction" of Indonesia. See supra Part I.B. (discussing varying levels of recognition
in the international community with regard to Indonesia's claimed sovereignty
over East Timor).
272. See Modalities Agreement, supra note 11, § G (providing that "the Indone-
sian authorities will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular con-
sultation process and will be responsible for the security of United Nations person-
nel."); Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 1 (stating that "responsibility to
ensure [a secure] environment as well as for the general maintenance of law and
order rests with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities.").
273. See General Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3 (granting Indonesia full re-
sponsibility for providing security).
274. See Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 3 (noting that the UN mission
will evaluate the security climate during the consultation process).
275. See id. (discussing how the UN mission will provide the Secretary-General
with evaluations of the security climate).
276. See id. para. 4 (mentioning the advisory duties of UNAMET civilian police
officers).
277. See Decolonization Committee Hearings, supra note 261 (providing the
testimony of witnesses who warned of the potential for violence through testifying
to specific examples).
278. See General Agreement, supra note 10, para. 3 (establishing that "prior to
the start of the registration, the Secretary-General shall ascertain ... that the neces-
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integration militias carried out their promise to spread violence
across East Timor and the Indonesian military forces did not stop
them; the only measure the Secretary General could take under the
May 5 Agreements was to postpone the vote.
Arguably, paragraph 3 might have even encouraged pro-
integration militias to continue their violent campaign in East
Timor.28 Representatives of these groups have stressed their opposi-
tion to the East Timorese popular consultation. Given that the
drafters agreed the popular consultation could only take place in a
peaceful environment, pro-integration militias might be persuaded to
create a violent environment in an effort to postpone the vote indefi-
nitely 2
2. A Lack of hnplemnentation of the faY 5 Agreements: the
Consequences that Followed
Neither Indonesia nor the UN were able to uphold their duties un-
der the flawed May 5 Agreements. Indonesia did not provide ade-
quate security, and the UN allowed the vote to take place in a hostile
environment. While the result of the vote reflected the political will
of the people, the events which followed the vote placed actual self-
governance far out of reach.28 Hundreds of East Timorese were mur-
sary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation
process.")
279. See S.C. Res. 1257, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 403 1st mtg., para. 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1257 (1999) (extending the mandate of UNAMET for one month fol-
lowing the Secretary-General's decision to postpone the popular consultation).
280. See General Agreement, supra note 10, para. 3 (requiring security to be
necessary for the vote to take place).
281. See Keith Richburg, Militias Hit L.N. /fice in E. Timor. Anti-
Independence Violence Continues, WASH. POST, June 30, 1999, at Al (reporting
that the pro-Indonesian militias have been intimidating the East Timorese to reject
independence).
282. See id. (reporting that a June attack on a UN outpost could jeopardize the
peace plan envisioned in the May 5 Agreements).
283. See U.N. Council Authorizes U.N. Troops For East Timor, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1999, at A8 [hereinafter U.N. Troops br East Tinior] (noting that East
Timor will most likely be under UN control for at least two to three years while the
UN helps the East Timorese rebuild).
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dered 284 and thousands were displaced. 8'5 The UN will have to spend
many years and millions of dollars to help rebuild the destroyed ter-
ritory.
28 6
a. Indonesian Implementation of Security Under the May 5
Agreements
The Indonesian government was either unwilling or unable to im-
plement the security provisions of the May 5 Agreements.117 As pre-
dicted, the pro-integration militias began a violent campaign once the
May 5 Agreements were signed, including an attack on UNAMET
headquarters. Indonesian security forces did little to stop them! 9 In
fact, according to some UN reports, members of the Indonesian
military supplied the pro-integration militias with weapons.5' 9 The
UN bodies, exercising responsibility in the fullest sense possible Lin-
der the terms of the May 5 Agreements, repeatedly brought these re-
ports to the attention of Indonesian officials/9' In response to UN
pressure, the Indonesian government issued orders to its security
forces to abide by the May 5 Agreements' security provisions./"
Evidence demonstrates, however, that the Indonesian police and
284. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19, paras. 19-28 (providing official
reports of known killings since the popular consultation took place).
285. See id. paras. 29-34, 37-38, 39-44 (discussing "forcible expulsions, " "en-
forced and involuntary disappearances, "and "displaced persons").
286. See U.N. Troops for East Timor, supra note 283 (providing U.N. cost esti-
mates for the rebuilding effort in East Timor, reaching up to SI billion per year).
287. See Richburg, East Timor Spirals, supra note 97, at Al (noting the seeming
helplessness of the Indonesian security forces to prevent the mass destruction that
occurred in East Timor following the vote).
288. See id. (stating that over 100 pro-Indonesian militiamen attacked the
UNAMET headquarters in Maliana, injuring a South African diplomat and at least
a dozen East Timorese).
289. See id. (discussing how the Indonesian military supported armed attacks by
the militias).
290. Id.
291. See Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 3 (commenting on the role of
UNAMET to provide the Secretary-General with "objective evaluations").
292. See Richburg, East Timor Spirals, supra note 97, at AI (reporting that the




military forces disregarded those messages.
b. The UN's Response to Security Breaches
The lack of security implementation in East Timor was successful
in delaying the popular consultation from its originally scheduled
date under the Modalities Agreement.:" Exercising his authority un-
der paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement, the Secretary General
determined that East Timor was not ready for an August 8 popular
consultation. However, the pro-integration militias, aided by Indone-
sian security forces, were not able to get rid of the vote completely. 'A
Despite the clear lack of security in East Timor, Secretary General
Kofi Annan allowed the vote to take place. " " On August 30, 1999,
the East Timorese expressed their will to pursue independence.:
When the Secretary General allowed the vote in East Timor, he
failed to implement his responsibilities under the May 5 Agree-
ments. 98 While Paragraph 3 of the Security agreement specifically
required him to determine a safe environment before allowing the
vote,29 the security situation between August 8 and August 30 did
not improve."' Despite the increasing violence, the East Timorese
293. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19 (detailing the breakdown of law
and order in East Timor following the vote).
294. See S.C. Res. 1257, supra note 279 (expanding UNANIET's mandate and
delaying the popular consultation).
295. See Keith Richburg, Voters in E. Timor Flock to the Polls; Killing oi L *.,.
Worker, Militia Terror Fail to Stop Balloting on Independence, WASH. POST, Aug.
31, 1999, at A7 (reporting a 98.6% voter turnout on August 30, 1999).
296. The Secretary-General called for no further delays after Resolution 1257
was passed. See S.C. Res. 1257, supra note 279 (broadening UNAMET's mandate
and staying the popular consultation to a later date).
297. See East Tinorese Reject Autonon', supra note 17 (announcing that 21.5
percent of the East Timorese voted in favor of. and 78.5 percent voted against In-
donesia's autonomy proposal).
298. See Security Agreement, supra note 12. para. 3 (requiring the Secretary-
General to determine whether the "necessary security situation exist[ed] for the
peaceful implementation of the consultation process.").
299. See id. (providing that "prior to the start of the registration, the Secretary-
General shall ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the UN mission, that
the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of the con-
sultation process.").
300. See Seth Mydans, Fearful of Militias, East Timor to Iote on its Future,
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supported Annan's decision to let the vote take place.3 "' Had Annan
properly exercised his responsibilities under the May 5 Agreements,
he would have waited until the environment was more secure.
c. Events in East Timor Following the August 30 Vote and the
UN Response: Security Council Resolution 1246
On September 3, 1999, officials counted the votes for the East
Timorese popular consultation."' The UN reported that nearly eighty
percent of the East Timorese voters rejected Indonesia's plan for
autonomous integration.304 Immediately, pro-integration militias con-
ducted a systematic "slash and bum" campaign,' 05 forced approxi-
mately two-hundred thousand East Timorese into the hills and an-
other one-hundred-fifty thousand into West Timorese refugee
camps, 3°6 and targeted specific individuals for execution, including
nuns, priests, and prominent pro-independence supporters.""7 For
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Mydans, Featfud Vote] (reporting
on escalating violence approaching the ballot, including kidnappings, threats, and
displacement).
301. See The United Nations and East Timor, para. 8, avaliable at
<http://www.un.org./peace/etimor/qnaloct.htm> (explaining that the Secretary-
General decided to proceed with the popular consultation in East Timor because
"despite violence and intimidation... East Timorese leaders and people in com-
munities indicated their support for continuing the process."). Not only did the
people of East Timor express their support for continuing with the vote, but the
UN Security Council, member states of the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal did not
express opposition to the Secretary-General's decision at any time). See id. (pro-
viding justification for the UN's decision to allow the August 30th popular con-
sultation of the East Timorese, despite mounting threats of violence in the region).
302. See Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 3 (requiring the Secretary-
General to determine whether the "necessary security situation exist[ed] for the
peaceful implementation of the consultation process before allowing a vote.").
303. See East Timorese Reject Autonomy, supra note 17 (announcing the results
of the August 30th vote, which rejected Indonesia's autonomy proposal).
304. See id. (announcing that 21.5% of the East Timorese voted in favor of, and
78.5% voted against Indonesia's autonomy proposal).
305. See Richburg, East Timor Spirals, supra note 97, at Al.
306. See Human Rights Report, supra note 19, para. 45 (detailing that hundreds
of homes and the entire business district in Dili had been burned). Some suspected
that displacement of the East Timorese might have been planned by Indonesian
authorities. See id. para. 29.
307. See id. paras. 19-20 (reporting that pro-independence leaders and clergy
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nearly two weeks, the Indonesian government insisted it could con-
trol the situation and uphold its responsibility under the May 5
Agreements." 8 Instead, the violence continued to escalate."' The UN
continued to perform its duties under the May 5 Agreements,"" issu-
ing reports to the Security Council and pressuring the Indonesian
government to either quell the violence or allow UN intervention.
After two weeks of systematic violence," the UN determined that
the situation was a breach to international peace and security."' At
that time, the Indonesian government agreed to allow international
intervention. '14 On September 15, 1999, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 1264, authorizing a multinational force to replace
the Indonesian police force.' ' Shortly thereafter, one thousand Aus-
members were killed for their support of independence); see also The Rampage,
supra note 99 (reporting on target killings of nuns, priests, and the leader of the
East Timorese independence movement).
308. See Keith B. Richburg, 'olence Torn E. Timor Put Under Martial Law,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1999, at AI (reporting that the Indonesian government gave
conflicting explanations for the violence, first blaming tensions between pro-
Indonesian and pro-independence factions, and then downplaying the level of vio-
lence altogether).
309. See id. (reporting that the Indonesian police were deserting their units in
large numbers and joining the pro-integration militias in terrorizing East Timorese
citizens and foreigners alike).
310. See Security Agreement, supra note 12, para. 3 (discussing UNAMET's
role to provide reports).
311. See Kofi Annan Say's Time Has Come lor Indonesia to Seek International
Community's Help to Bring Order and Securt " to East Timor, available at
<http://wwvvv.un.org/News/Press/docs,/1999> [hereinafter Time Has Come] (state-
ment of Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations) (urging the Indonesian
government to relinquish its control over security in East Timor).
312. See Keith B. Richburg, Jakarta Asks U.N. Force to End E. Timor Turmoil;
Australian-Led Troops May Arrive TWithin Days, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1999, at
Al [hereinafter Richburg, Jakarta Asks Force to End] (reporting on the two weeks
of violence, including burning, looting, and murder, which followed the August
30th vote in East Timor).
313. See S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR. 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1264 (1999) (reporting that the UN "determin[ed] that the present situation
in East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security.").
314. See Richburg, Jakarta Asks Force to End, supra note 312 (stating that In-
donesian President B.J. Habibie announced Indonesia would allow peacekeepers
into East Timor).
315. See S.C. Res. 1264, supra note 313, para. 3 (establishing a multinational
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tralian troops arrived in East Timor to restore order.3t6 On October
25, 1999 the Security Council authorized eleven thousand troops to
join the existing operation.1 7 The cost of repairing East Timor might
reach anywhere from seven-hundred million to one billion dollars."'
The humanitarian and economic costs discussed above may have
been prevented had the drafters of the May 5 Agreements realisti-
cally considered the implications of entrusting Indonesia with secu-
rity. Even with the flawed security provisions, if the May 5 Agree-
ments had been properly implemented, first by Indonesia and then by
the UN, the consultation would not have taken place until a secure
environment existed. As more movements for self-determination
arise in the future, careful planning and implementation will ensure
respect for human rights.
V. CRITERIA FOR NEGOTIATING AND
IMPLEMENTING SUCCESSFUL UN
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT AGREEMENTS
"I don't see how people around the world can trust the United Na-
tions again."3 9
force to restore peace and security in East Timor). Chapter VII of the UN Charter
authorizes the UN to take such action when the Security Council determines a
breach of international peace and security has taken place. See U.N. CHARTER, art.
42 (allowing the UN to intervene if "necessary to restore international peace and
security."). Under Article 42, "such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by ai, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations."
Id. (emphasis added).
316. See Doug Struck, In East Timor, Smiles Greet Peacekeepers; Armed Pa-
trols Meet No Resistance, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at A l (observing that the
Australian led peacekeeping force met no armed resistance upon arrival).
317. See U.N. Troops for East Timor, supra note 283 (recognizing that the new
mission will take two to three years to accomplish).
318. See id. (disclosing the possible cost of the mission according to UN Under-
Secretary-General, Bernard Miyet).




In order to regain the trust of the international community,'" the
UN should take heed of the mistakes made in East Timor. Both the
humanitarian and economic costs of such an operation are discour-
aging.32' The political and economic barriers the UN must face when
approached for electoral assistance beg the question, "should the UN
respond to requests for organization and conduct missions?"
The UN is the best-suited organization to accommodate the needs
of countries requesting the organization and conduct of an election,
but political factors often hinder the Organization's efforts. Should
the UN choose to respond to requests for the organization and con-
duct of an election in an area of conflict, the Organization must not
sacrifice security for political expediency.", Security can be more
likely assured so long as the UN incorporates the following elements
into the negotiation process: (1) unqualified consent of all the par-
ties; (2) international support; and (3) adequate security arrange-
ments. This Part recommends that the UN should continue to organ-
ize and conduct elections, so long as the Organization modifies its
procedures to explicitly require the elements above. If these elements
are applied to future missions within legally binding agreements, the
mistakes of East Timor may be avoided.
A. THE UN SHOULD CONTINUE TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT
ELECTIONS
It would be tempting to argue that the best way for the UN to
avoid mistakes like the ones made in East Timor is to avoid organi-
zation and conduct missions altogether. By restricting its assistance
to supervision, verification, and standard electoral missions, the UN
could certify elections without having to assume the risks associated
with organization and conduct missions. ': 3 However, without UN in-
320. See Annan, supra note 239 (admitting that humanitarian crises hurt the
reputation of the UN).
321. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (predicting the expense of East
Timor); see also Canibodia-UNTAC, supra note 185 (stating the cost of UNTAC
and its counterpart UNAMIC to be S 1,620,963,300).
322. See Annan, supra note 239 (calling for a redefinition of sovereignty to bet-
ter assist the UN in enforcing international peace and security).
323. In supervision, verification, and standard missions, national election
authorities take responsibility for carrying out all electoral processes, while the UN
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volvement, nations or territories in crisis seeking an international
solution may be forced to endure intractable civil wars. '
Some argue that inter-governmental organizations ("IGOs") are
better suited to provide electoral assistance than the UN."5 Regional
IGOs have the advantage of cultural, political, or historical similari-
ties that could lend to the election monitoring process."' In the case
of East Timor, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
could have taken the UN's role of election monitor. 3
However, the very aspects that allow a regional organization's
ability to assist in election monitoring could also lead to bias in that
organization."" The East Timor case demonstrates how this could be
problematic. While Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, Portugal and
East Timor are not. 29 If ASEAN had joined the May 5 Agreements
certifies the results with varying degrees. See discussion supra Part II.B (defining
and comparing the different models of UN electoral assistance with varying de-
grees). In organization and conduct missions, the UN assumes the responsibility of
the local election authorities. See Main Types, supra note 136 (explaining that the
UN assumes the responsibility of national election authorities in organization and
conduct missions).
324. See discussion supra Parts I, III.B (providing the history of civil unrest in
East Timor left to ferment for nearly twenty-five years due to international inac-
tion).
325. See Hodgson, supra note 7, at 159 (arguing that many IGOs have compre-
hensive democracy building programs already in place).
326. See id. (viewing these factors as favorable to an IGO-monitored election);
see also BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 223 (mentioning that observers from regional
organizations might have a better understanding of territories in their region than
would UN observers).
327. See ASEAN Bangkok Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, art. 2.2, 6 I.L.M. 1223
[hereinafter ASEAN Declaration] (stating ASEAN's founding principle for the
promotion of "regional peace and stability"). Article 2 of the ASEAN Declaration
provides that the regional organization's aim is to: ". .. promote regional peace
and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relation-
ship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United
Nations Charter." Id.
328. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 223 (arguing that countries requiring
election monitoring may distrust a regional organization's attachment to local con-
tingencies).
329. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Country Profiles: Member
Countries, avalable at<http://www.aseansec.org/> (listing all current ASEAN
members: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam)
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instead of the UN, Indonesia may have had too much bargaining
330power.
Just as the UN and IGOs have entered into agreements for the su-
pervision of elections, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
have also taken up the cause." NGOs are often small, grassroots or-
ganizations that can easily respond to changing circumstances, unre-
strained from the bureaucracy often connected to the UN or IGOs.""
Often NGOs can remain impartial as they are less vulnerable to po-
333litical concerns.
Even though NGOs are not tied to governments, they may have
some government affiliation, and often have their own political
agenda.3" According to one scholar, Yves Beigbeder, most interna-
tional election observing has been organized by United States'
NGOs, creating a suspicion in the international community that these
NGOs are agents of foreign policy."3 NGOs might also lack the fi-
330. Indonesia is one of ten members of ASEAN. See id. Indonesia is also one
of 188 UN member states. See United Nations Member States, available at
<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html> (listing the names of all UN
member states, as well as the date each state became a member). Considering the
number of members in each organization, Indonesia's greater influence in ASEAN
could have led to bias. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 223 (arguing that countries
requesting electoral assistance may feel that the UN would be less likely to bend to
regional pressures).
331. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 270 (pointing to the increasing role of
NGOs in election monitoring); Hodgson, supra note 7, at 160 (arguing NGOs can
be better equipped to monitor an election than the UN in some cases).
332. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 271 (listing the "built-in" advantages of
NGOs and comparing them to IGOs).
333. See id. (arguing that since NGOs are not subject to governmental or inter-
governmental policies, they can avoid political pressure more easily than IGOs).
But see Hodgson, supra note 7, at 160 n. 120 (considering the actual independence
of NGOs to be a questionable advantage).
334. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 272-73 (arguing that while, in theory,
NGOs have no governmental affiliation, their activities in election monitonng are
definitely political).
335. See id. at 273 (listing some of the United States' NGOs involved in election
monitoring). These NGOs include: AFL/CIO, Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, Freedom House, Washington Office on Latin America, American
Conservative Union, American Security Council, America's Watch, Lawyers
Committee for International Human Rights, the International Human Rights Law
Group, the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, the Council of
2000]
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nancial resources necessary to fund a large election movement. '" In
elections enmeshed in conflict, as was the case in East Timor, NGOs
do not have the authority that the UN or a regional organization
would have to restore peace and security. 7
Few organizations can give the legitimacy to an election that the
UN can."' While the UN, IGOs, and NGOs are each susceptible to
political pressure or economic barriers, the UN is the best equipped
to remain impartial in monitoring an election process. 39 The UN
does not have regional bias and has access to the financial support of
the entire international community. Most importantly, the UN is the
only international organization legally allowed to determine the need
for and implement enforcement."' Should the UN decide to negotiate
an agreement for a self-determination election in an area of conflict,
it must follow the criteria outlined below.
B. UNQUALIFIED CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES
Before agreeing to organize and conduct an election, the UN must
secure the unqualified consent of all parties having a stake in the
election process. For any major mission, both state and non-state
actors should participate in the negotiations. If the parties request an
organization and conduct mission, each must accept complete UN
control of the process, including security, so that the UN is able to
Freely-Elected Heads of Government, and the International Foundation for Elec-
toral Systems.
336. See id. at 294.
337. Only the UN Security Council can authorize intervention to restore inter-
national peace and security, either through UN peacekeepers or through approving
missions sponsored by regional organizations. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 42 (author-
izing the Security Council to "take such action... as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security); see id. art. 53, para. I (authorizing the
Security Council to "utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforce-
ment action").
338. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 223 (describing how many territories
seeking UN electoral assistance believe UN involvement to have more significant
international recognition than an IGO or NGO election); Hodgson, supra note 7, at
149-50 (noting the legitimacy attached to an elected government when the UN is
involved).
339. See Vu, supra note 180, at 1222 (concluding that the UN's capability to be
impartial is superior to other organizations).
340. U.N. CHARTER, art. 42.
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carry out the process with minimal interference. Such an approach to
organization and conduct negotiations would ensure that subsequent
missions achieve a fair result in an environment free of fear and in-
timidation.
1. Involving the Interested Parties
In organization and conduct missions, each detail must be consid-
ered by each of the parties involved, including representatives from
the territory seeking self-determination. This means that in cases of
external self-determination, representatives of the administering
state, occupying state, and non-self-governing territory should nego-
tiate the terms of the consultation and come to an agreement, pro-
viding a detailed plan for every step of the consultation process and
the responsibilities therein.- 2 In cases of internal self-determination,
the requesting state and opposing factions should each conclude an
agreement.
343
341. See, e.g., General Peace Agreement, supra note 170 (including the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Mozambique, Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, and the
President of resistance (RENAMO), Afanso Dhlakama, in the negotiation process
for a popular consultation in Mozambique): The Agreement on a Comprehensive
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, art. 2 [hereinafter
Paris Accords] (including representatives from 19 states in the negotiation process
that led to the formation of UNTAC in Cambodia). The signatories to the Paris
Accords included Australia, Brunei, Cambodia. Canada, China, France. India, In-
donesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Id. Also,
the warring factions in Cambodia expressed their support for UNTAC through be-
coming parties to the Paris Agreements on October 30, 1991. See Canhodian Set-
tlement Agreement, supra note 192 (including representatives from the four fac-
tions in Cambodia). Unlike the agreements above, which included all relevant
parties, East Timorese leaders were not signatories to the May 5 Agreements. See
May 5 Agreements Press Conference, supra note 13 (discussing how only repre-
sentatives from Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN concluded the lay 5 Agree-
ments).
342. See General Peace Agreement, supra note 170 (providing a detailed plan
for Mozambique's popular consultation, decided upon by key parties).
343. See Paris Accords, supra note 341 (concluding an agreement betveen the
Cambodian government and rebel factions.) Paris Conflrence on ('ambodia:
Agreements Elaborating the Framework for a Comprehensive Pohtical Settlement
on the Cambodia Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/46/608, S,23177, Oct. 30, 1991, art. 2, re-
printed in, 31 I.L.M. 174 [hereinafter Paris Con~ference ..Igreentwnts] (1992) (pro-
viding detailed plans for every aspect of the consultation process, including human
rights provisions, modalities for administering the vote, military arrangements,
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In the organization and conduct mission to Cambodia (UNTAC),3144
the UN employed the approach recommended above. In fact, Indo-
nesia was the interested state that proposed all factions, including
state and non-state actors, negotiate a solution to the Cambodian
conflict.4 1 In the subsequent Paris Agreement, over nineteen states
consented to complete UN implementation of the electoral process,
including security.346
2. Requiring Unqualified Consent
In East Timor, only two state actors gave consent to a UN pres-
ence, and Indonesia's consent was qualified. 'f As a result, the UN
could not implement the provisions of the May 5 Agreements in a
safe environment.'4 As a number of scholars have stressed, the im-
partial implementation of an election plan is essential to success. 4 " A
state with a history of forceful occupation of a non-self-governing
territory is a biased party, and thus should not take responsibility for
any aspect of the consultation process. A sovereign state opposed to
the succession of a sub-group within its borders may use its re-
sources to thwart the process as well.35 If the potential for bias ex-
civil administration, law and order, resettlement of refugees, and reconstruction).
344. See generally Cambodian Settlement Agreement, supra note 192; Paris
Conference Agreements, supra note 343; Paris Accords, supra note 341 (involving
the consent of all interested parties in the Cambodian crisis).
345. See RATNER, supra note 2, at 143 (noting Indonesia's role in bringing to-
gether Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and
Cambodia's four factions to resolve questions of Cambodian self-determination
and end the conflict).
346. See supra note 341 (listing the countries participating in the Cambodian
organization and conduct negotiations, all agreeing to the presence of UN security
forces).
347. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining the UN consent requirement
and discussing Indonesia's partial consent).
348. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. (criticizing the UN implementation, or
lack thereof, of its limited security duties).
349. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 299-300 (asserting that regardless of
whether the observers are affiliated with the UN, NGOs, or IGOs, impartiality is
the key to a successful election); Vu, supra note 180, at 1222-24 (noting how the
UN's impartiality in Cambodia allowed the organization to gain the trust of the
people and fostered a free and fair election).
350. See, e.g., Vu, supra note 180, at 1202 (discussing the State of Cambodia's
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ists, the UN should control the implementation process and require
unqualified consent.
a. Problems of Achieving Consent - Issues of Bias
Keeping biased parties out of the implementation process is a dif-
ficult task. By the very nature of bias, such parties have a stake in the
election process and may resist UN efforts to control implementa-
tion."' In the negotiations leading to the May 5 Agreements, Indone-
sia insisted on implementing the security component.'" Faced with a
breakdown in talks .. the UN and Portugal conceded to Indonesia's
wishes, securing Indonesia's promise to keep the security force
"neutral."3'' As the following events show, however, Indonesia broke
that promise. If the UN is under pressure to provide a clearly biased
party with implementation privileges, it should remember Indone-
sia's actions.
An insistence by the UN to keep biased parties out of the imple-
mentation process is essential for free and fair elections, but comes
with many risks. If the UN insists upon controlling implementation
during the pre-agreement stages of negotiation, a biased party may
refuse to sign the agreement,' 55 just as Indonesia did.' ' If a non-
efforts to interfere with the popular consultation in Cambodia).
351. For example, Indonesia refused to accept the UN's onginal draft for the
mission, which included UN security provisions. See Mufson & Lynch, supra note
203, at Al (reporting that Indonesian officials scratched out disarmament provi-
sions of the original UN draft proposal).
352. The UN said as much when trying to justify its reasoning for the security
arrangements under the May 5 Agreements. See East Timor: United Nations Mis-
sion in East Timor (UNAMET): Questions and .Answers: The United ,Vations and
East Timo, available at <w-vw.un.org/peace/etimor99/Qnafame.html> [herein-
after East Tinor Q&A] (explaining that Indonesia clearly stated it would only con-
tinue with the negotiations if the parties agreed Indonesia would provide security).
353. See Mufson & Lynch, supra note 203, at AI (quoting UN diplomats, who
expressed the tight position the UN faced when Indonesia refused to accept UN
security proposals).
354. See East Timor Q&A, supra note 352 (explaining that "the UN felt that,
despite the risks, the historic opportunity had to be seized.").
355. See Vu, supra note 180, at 1234 (considering the necessity for "broad sup-
port within a state for UN involvement" in the context of the Cambodian election).
356. See East Timnor Q&A, supra note 352 (bringing up Indonesia's threat as a
justification for UN concessions over security issues).
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cooperating party happens to be a state claiming sovereignty over the
area in question, the UN Charter forbids interference.
37
b. Responding to Qualified Consent
The UN should not concede to the unreasonable demands of a bi-
ased party, especially one with a history of illegal occupation over a
38given territory under any circumstances. When faced with such a
situation the UN should choose one of the following three options:
(1) end the negotiations; (2) offer an alternative model of assistance;
or (3) appeal to the Security Council for a Chapter VII interven-
tion.359
Outside of the decolonization model, the UN involves itself in all
models of electoral assistance only when invited to do so.""' Al-
though this procedure was not customary in decolonization elections,
the UN responded to the East Timor election through such an invita-
tion."" When considering such an invitation, the UN should set out
clear preconditions for its involvement, including UN centralized
implementation. 62 If the parties extending an invitation for an or-
ganization and conduct mission are unwilling to accept the UN's
terms the UN could simply refuse the invitation, or offer an alterna-
tive mission.
Abandoning the negotiation process is not necessarily the answer.
357. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, paras. 4, 7 (forbidding member states and the
UN itself from interfering with matters under the "domestic jurisdiction" of an-
other member state).
358. See discussion infira notes 363-376 (providing alternative responses to
qualified consent).
359. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides that the "Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER,
art. 39.
360. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 149 (noting that the "second generation"
of UN-sponsored elections emerged from states inviting the UN to take a role that
is within the states' domestic jurisdiction).
361. See General Agreement, supra note 10 (inviting the UN to monitor the
popular consultation in East Timor, but not to provide security).
362. See Vu, supra note 180, at 1232 (emphasizing the importance of UN in-
volvement throughout the entire election process.).
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A UN refusal to an organization and conduct invitation in an area of
conflict could jeopardize the Organization's primary goal of ensuring
international peace and security.3'3 Had the UN abandoned the nego-
tiations leading to the May 5 Agreements, the East Timorese would
remain subject to violent clashes between independence supporters
and Indonesian police.3 4 With East Timor's right to self-
determination unrealized, these acts of aggression could have con-
stituted a breach to international peace and security.""
Instead of allowing a crisis to escalate by refusing organization
and conduct assistance, the UN could offer a less involved mission to
a requesting state. For example, if a party refused to cooperate in the
area of security, the UN could offer a verification mission. "" In that
case, the requesting state would conduct the elections, with the UN1 "67
verifying the results. This scenario is problematic for territories in
conflict, however, because it places the UN at a greater disadvantage
in determining whether an election's results are free and fair.' If the
UN had opted for a verification or supervision mission in East
Timor, either Indonesia or Portugal would have conducted the con-
sultation.3 69 By allowing UNAMET to oversee the modalities in East
363. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1 (noting the maintenance of international
peace and security as the UN's first purpose), see also Vu, supra note ISO, at 1235
(arguing that had the UN withdrawn from Cambodia, the fighting would have in-
tensified).
364. There was no reason to doubt Indonesia's oppression of the East Timorese
would continue. See discussion supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Indonesia's history of aggression against the East Timorese).
365. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39 (defining acts of aggression as grounds for UN
intervention).
366. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, para. 10 (ex-
plaining how local authorities organize and conduct verification missions).
367. See id.
368. Logically, if the UN organizes and conducts a mission, it is better able to
determine if the mission was carried out fairly. See Satterthwaite, supra note 7, at
744 (discussing the all-encompassing role of the UN in organization and conduct
missions generally, and pointing out the success of UNTAC in completing such
tasks).
369. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, paras. 9-10 (ex-
plaining the UN's certification role in supervision and verification missions, as op-
posed to its administrative role in organization and conduct missions). This would
create an additional problem because the parties would have to determine which
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Timor, the UN could more accurately verify that the August 30
popular consultation results reflected the will of the East Timorese.""
Abandoning the negotiation process thwarts the UN's mission of
ensuring international peace and security, but partial involvement
makes the Organization's efforts equally ineffective. If a biased party
known for acts of aggression refuses to cooperate in the negotiations
leading to a self-determination election, the UN Charter provides a
remedy.3 7 Chapter VII makes actionable any "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression., 7 1 Instead of conceding to
a biased party, in circumstances where acts of aggression by that bi-
ased party are known, the Secretary General should halt the negotia-
tions and defer the matter to the Security Council.'7' Under Chapter
VII, the Security Council may evaluate the facts and determine what
course to take. 4 If the aggression does not rise to the level of breach,
then the UN should not involve itself further. 7' However, if the Se-
curity Council concludes that the aggression is actionable, the UN
can take appropriate matters to remedy the situation without the bi-
state, Portugal as an administrating state or Indonesia as an occupying state, would
organize and conduct the mission. See id. (explaining that the local election
authorities assume responsibility for conducting an election in supervision or veri-
fication missions); discussion supra Part I.A-C, III.B (explaining the problems
long associated with determining which nation was East Timor's legal sovereign).
Even in the preamble to the General Agreement, Indonesia and Portugal could not
agree upon East Timor's status. See General Agreement, supra note 10, preamble,
paras. 5-6 (noting Indonesia's position that it should be considered sovereign over
East Timor, and Portugal's position that such recognition should not be granted by
the UN).
370. See GeneralAgreement, supra note 10, preamble, para. 7 (agreeing that the
UN was best equipped to consult the East Timorese in light of the differing views
of Portugal and Indonesia regarding the territory's status).
371. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 41-42 (providing peaceful and forceful measures
the Security Council may employ to maintain or restore international peace and
security, including: economic sanctions, interruptions in the flow of communica-
tion. severance of diplomatic relations, demonstrations, blockades, or other uses of
force by land, sea, or air).
372. Id. art. 39.
373. See id. art. 99 (requiring the Secretary-General to report "any matter which
in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.").
374. See id. art. 39 (giving sole authority to the Security Council to determine
whether action is needed).





Driven by the consensus of its members, the UN cannot take any
of the steps outlined above without the political or financial support
of the international community. The UN cannot accept a request to
organize and conduct an election without the agreement among key
member states that such a mission is necessary.' Nor can the UN
authorize peace enforcement unless the Security Council member
states determine such enforcement is an appropriate response.'" All
UN undertakings require financial contributions from its members."'
Without these, the UN is powerless to act.
1. Political Support
As mentioned in Part III, political factors shape UN enforcement
of the right to self-determination. The UN Security Council is com-
posed of fifteen states that often have competing political interests."
Unless this diverse group can come to an agreement, the UN Charter
forbids any type of enforcement"
The Security Council often sanctions UN involvement in electoral
assistance missions once the immediate parties demonstrate a desire
for such assistance and consent to UN intervention. East Timor is a
376. See id. (allowing enforcement measures taken under Chapter VII to over-
ride prohibitions on the violation of sovereignty).
377. See RATNER, supra note 2, at 36 (noting in the greater context of
peacekeeping missions, that UN member state support is required before the UN
may intervene, despite the consent of the parties requesting assistance).
378. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 27(3) (requiring at least nine members of the Secu-
rity Council to vote in favor of a mission, with the concurrence of all Permanent
Security Council Members).
379. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 187 (stressing the importance of financial
support in any UN electoral assistance mission).
380. See U.N. CHARTER, para. 1 (describing the composition of the Security
Council).
381. See id. art. 27, para. 3 (restricting UN decisions on matters other than pro-
cedure to a consensus of nine Security Council members and the complete concur-
rence of the permanent members).
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case in point."' Once Indonesia consented to a UN organization and
conduct mission, the Security Council established UNAMET. '"
However, if the immediate parties give limited or no consent, the Se-
curity Council may refuse mission requests. This was demonstrated
in the twenty-five years that Portugal's petitions for UN intervention
in East Timor went unanswered.
38 4
With clear Security Council support, the Secretary General may
approach negotiations from a stronger position. ' If a requesting
party becomes uncooperative, the Secretary General can appeal for
386enforcement action.
2. Financial Support
Even with the political support of its members, the UN cannot un-
dertake an organization and conduct mission without substantial fi-
nancial support. Organization and conduct missions are typically the
most expensive type of UN electoral assistance.18 7 For example,
UNTAC cost a total of about one point seven billion (USD) 8 If the
UN cannot afford to take on the responsibilities of an organization
and conduct mission, it should decline the request.
382. See S.C. Res. 1246, supra note 14 (sanctioning UN involvement in East
Timor through the establishment of UNAMET).
383. See id.
384. See discussion supra Part I (chronicling the history of Indonesia's illegal
occupation of East Timor and the Security Council's inaction in enforcing peace).
385. For example, nineteen member states, including Security Council mem-
bers, negotiated the agreements that led to the organization and conduct mission in
Cambodia. See generally Cambodian Settlement Agreement, supra note 192; Paris
Conference Agreements, supra note 343; Paris Accords, supra note 341 (involving
the support of all interested parties in the Cambodian crisis, each agreeing to UN
security forces).
386. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 99 (stating that "the Secretary-General may bring
to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.").
387. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, para. 8 (noting the
excessive cost of organization and conduct missions).
388. See Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governnents to
Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 41, para. 23, U.N.
Doc. A/50/332 (1995) (providing the cost of UNTAC).
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D. ADEQUATE SECURITY PROVISIONS
Once the UN secures the consent of interested parties and the po-
litical and financial support of the international community, the Sec-
retary General must negotiate an agreement that includes adequate
security provisions without compromise. Adequate security does not
mean UN-controlled security forces alone. In addition to insisting on
such forces, the UN must also guarantee that the organization and
conduct mission have sufficient time to assess the environment.
1. Securit " Forces
The central problem with the organization and conduct mission in
East Timor was the lack of security. Had the East Timorese officials
been involved in the negotiation process, the concerns of security
might have been addressed more extensively. ' " Given the history of
Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor and its refusal to com-
ply with the UN, assigning security responsibility to Indonesia was
risky at best. 9 It negated all possibility for a safe election.! Fur-
thermore, providing an organization and conduct mission without
UN security forces broke with UN precedent. In the words of Brian
Urquhart, biographer of former UN Secretary General Dag Ham-
marskjold: "Hammarskjold's basic view of international peace and
security was that a reliable and just world order could only be built
pragmatically by making precedents and by case la%% ..... 2
Allowing Indonesia to provide security during the popular con-
sultation was an illogical break from precedent based on its missions
in Cambodia and Croatia."" As in East Timor, the threat of violence
389. See discussion supra Part V.B. 1 and accompanying text (adv'ocating for the
involvement of all affected parties, including independence leaders in East Timor).
390. See Mufson & Lynch, supra note 203, at Al (quoting a senior UN official,
who feared violence from the Indonesian forces: "Apart from the moral oppro-
brium that would be heaped on the U.N. were we to folloN such a course, the con-
sequences for the long-term stability of East Timor would be disastrous.").
391. See id.
392. RATNER, supra note 2, at 237 (quoting Brian Urquhart. International Peace
and Secui-it,: Thoughts on the Twentieth .4nniversar " of Dag thaniniarskIold's
Death, 60 FOR. AFF. 1, 3 (1981)).
393. See discussion Part II.B.2 (comparing UNTAC and UNTAES to
UNAMET, which demonstrated a broadened UN involvement).
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
served to be the greatest obstacle to a free and fair election in Cam-
bodia. 9" The one striking difference between the Cambodian case
and that of East Timor, however, is that the Agreement on a Com-
prehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict ("Paris
Agreement"), allowed for UN security forces."' Similarly,
UNTAES's mandate in Croatia included UN security forces. 96
Of course, not every future popular consultation will require the
level of security that was necessary in East Tinor. 97 Nor will every
future popular consultation arise from conflict.'" However, in the
event that conflict is present, an adequate UN security presence is
necessary to secure a free vote.3
2. Ensuring a Climate Free of Fear and Intimidation
Having UN security forces is not enough to ensure peace in an or-
ganization and conduct mission. The mission needs time to establish
that the environment is conducive to a free and fair vote. As
UNAMET's success in implementing modalities shows, the time
used to implement logistical aspects of a consultation may not be
enough to ensure a climate free of fear and intimidation.4  The lack
of security in East Timor prompted the Secretary General to delay
the consultation only briefly.4 ' Even though security conditions
394. See Vu, supra note 180, at 1197-98 (analyzing the security situation in
Cambodia during the popular consultation).
395. See Paris Accords, supra note 341 (employing UNAMET with security re-
sponsibility with the consent of the parties).
396. See Croatia-UNTAES, supra note 185.
397. For example, the 1956 UN-sponsored plebiscite in Togoland did not re-
quire elevated security. See 19 UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION IN POPULAR
CONSULTATIONS AND ELECTIONS 15-16 (1983) (on file with the American Univer-
sity International Law Review).
398. See id. at 2 (stressing the varying applications of self-determination elec-
tions to meet the varying needs of different self-determination movements).
399. See id. at 6-7 (listing security as a necessary component, which should be
administered by the organizing parties).
400. See East Timorese Reject Autonomy, supra note 17 (statement of Kofi An-
nan, Secretary-General, United Nations) (praising UNAMET for managing to edu-
cate and register over 450,000 voters in less than two months).
401. Upon request from the Secretary-General, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1257, which delayed the consultation for 22 days. See S.C. Res. 1257,
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worsened, he allowed the vote to take place. " Yves Beigbeder ar-
ticulates the Secretary General's dilemma. According to Beigbeder,
there is no "right time" to hold an election in an area of conflict. He
believes that delays only support illegitimate regimes. Further, de-
lays in elections prevent democracy from taking place."'
When faced with obstacles of aggression, the UN must carefully
balance the need for an election to go forward and the Organization's
ability to combat violence in the region." In East Timor, there was
not a reliable security structure in place to curb this violence.'" Be-
cause two months was not enough time to ensure the safety of people
subjected to years of intimidation, delays were necessary.
CONCLUSION
If the UN seeks to restore peace and security through organization
and conduct missions, the Organization must approach requests from
states in conflict with caution. When the UN acquires the consent of
the parties, has the support of the international community, and can
determine the environment will be free of fear and intimidation, the
Organization should proceed with negotiations for electoral assis-
tance. Unfortunately, the UN compromised these standards when it
signed the May 5 Agreements.' °7
supra note 279 (delaying the vote and expanding UNAMET's mandate).
402. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text. Yves Beigbeder articu-
lates the Secretary-General's dilemma of delaying an election under threat of ac-
tual violence. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 298.
403. See Vu, supra note 180, at 1235 (hypothesizing that if the UN had delayed
the vote in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge would have seized the opportunity to
"hold hostage the electoral process.").
404. See discussion supra Parts IV.A, B.2.bc (considering whether the UN
should undertake organization and conduct missions, discussing alternative options
to qualified consent, and noting the importance of political and financial support).
405. See discussion supra Part IV.C. I (arguing that providing Indonesia with
security responsibility equaled a lack of inadequate security).
406. See UN Election Monitoring Guidelines, supra note 126, pam. 8 (requiring,
in most cases, 18 months as the minimum lead time for organization and conduct
missions).
407. In the negotiations leading up to the May 5 Agreements, the UN conceded
to Indonesia's unreasonable wishes, which did not allow for these necessary ele-
ments. See discussion supra Parts IV.B-D (stressing the importance of each ele-
ment for future elections, given the failure in East Timor based on their absence).
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As some scholars have argued, when the UN compromises, it can
at best only facilitate a "half-success. 40' The UN's act of signing the
May 5 Agreements raised the hopes of the East Timorese, leading to
high voter turnout and electoral success. However, the events that
followed equaled a humanitarian failure. 4  The UN's "half-success"
in East Timor damaged the international community's faith in the
Organization's ability to facilitate democracy through peaceful
means.40 In order to regain the international community's trust and
fulfill its duty to foster international peace and security, the UN can
no longer compromise its standards.
ADDENDUM
Since the submission and prior to the publication of this Com-
ment, the people of East Timor have enjoyed some progress under
• • , .- 411
UN administration. Yet, predictions are uncertain as to when the
408. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Hodgson, supra note 7,
at 173 (stressing that the UN should not compromise its standards when it agrees
to monitor elections).
409. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.c. (detailing the violent pro-integration
militia response to the vote).
410. See Annan, supra note 239 (citing the tragedy of East Timor as an example
of the international community reacting too late). As Yves Beigbeder wrote: "In
case of a "half success". . . the U.N. may either be complimented for its coura-
geous decision to take on an uncertain challenge, or, which is more likely, it may
be blamed for its unwieldy and costly intervention which raised and let down peo-
ple's expectations..." BEIGBEDER, supra note 4, at 219.
411. As mentioned supra note 49, the UN Security Council passed S.C. Res.
1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) to serve as a transitional government in East Timor until the East
Timorese achieve independence. On July 26, 2000, the Secretary-General provided
the most recent report to date on UNTAET's progress. See generally Transitional
Administration in East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General, 26 July 2000,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/738 (2000) available at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor
/docs/UntaetDr.htm> (reporting to the Security Council gains made by the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) for the period of
January 27, 2000 to July 26, 2000). According to the Secretary General:
Today, although it has not yet reached its full designated capacity, UNTAET
can look with satisfaction on what it has achieved so far. It has contributed to
the alleviation of the emergency brought about by the violence and destruc-
tion that followed the popular consultation las year; it has maintained a secure
enviornment; iut has established the foundations of an effective administra-
tion; and, above all, it has established a relationship of mutual respect and
trust with the East Timorese.
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East Timorese will enjoy true independence.' Thousands of East
Timorese remain in West Timorese refugee camps, living under the
threat of militia sponsored violence.'" Calls for extended peace en-
forcement have yet to be answered.'"
Id. at para. 63.
412. UNTAET's initial mandate ends on January 1. 2001. See S.C. Res. 1272,
supra note 49, at para. 17. According to East Timorese leader Jose Ramos Horta,
East Timor "hop[es] to declare full independence aflter elections at the end of next
year." East Tinorese Leader Encourages U.S. Role in Volatile Indonesha. WASH
POST, Sept. 22, 2000, at A20. Others predict the transition to independence will
take longer. See James Traub, Inventing East Timor, FOR. AFF. Jul.-Aug. 2000 at
74, 86 (arguing that it will take several years for East Timor to generate the ad-
ministrative workforce necessary to control the country. and that it will take even
longer for East Timor to enjoy economic stability without international support).
413. See Seth Mydans, Tinorese Refugees Tell of Terror ..lfter Fore(iners Left,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at AI (explaining that, following the UN withdrawal in
West Timor, refugees in West Timor are being held hostage by the militias). The
UN presence withdrew from West Timor following the death of three UN workers
on September 6, 2000. See S.C. Res. 1319 at para. 5, U.N. SCOR, 4195th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1319 (2000) (refusing to allow UNHCR workers to return to aid
the refugees until there is a "credible security guarantee").
414. See, e.g. Carlos Ximenes Belo. Help E. Timor now belbre it is too late,
STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 5, 2000. in 2000 WL 28084768 (expressing ap-
preciation for U.N. efforts, but concern that the international community is "'soft"
on the Indonesian military). Belo writes:
[H]ad foreign troops not intervened at all, my people would have faced anni-
hilation. We in East Timor are immensely grateful for this ... but once the
withdrawal [of Indonesian military forces] took place, international pressure
on the Indonesian military seemed to soften.
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